Standing Bear! Who? by Lake, James A., Sr.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 3 Article 2
1981
Standing Bear! Who?
James A. Lake Sr.
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
James A. Lake Sr., Standing Bear! Who?, 60 Neb. L. Rev. (1981)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol60/iss3/2
By James A. Lake, Sr.*
Standing Bear! Who?
On February 29, 1980, a Native American was enshrined in the
Nebraska Hall of Fame-the first of his race to be thus honored.1
Although he joined a very select group,2 Standing Bear, a Ponca
Chief known to his tribesmen as Ma-chu-nah-zha, is not well
known to Nebraskans. Indeed most non-Indians and probably
more than a few Native Americans know nothing about Chief
Standing Bear and the chain of events responsible for placing him
in the Hall of Fame. Because it was a courtroom scene involving
the law, a thoughtful judge, and the oratorical skills of lawyers and
of Standing Bear himself that gave the Ponca Chief a place in his-
tory and gave the Native American recognition under the law, it is
appropriate to recount that event in a periodical serving the legal
profession.
The saga of Standing Bear may not be isolated from the evolu-
tion of federal Indian law in general, because the epic which will
be recounted occurred during a time when the policy substructure
of federal Indian law was under intense reexamination. In fact,
Standing Bear's quest to remain a free man provides a springboard
for discussing a part of the historical development of federal In-
dian policy. Thus the modest aim of this article is, first, to set forth
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; A.B. University of
Nebraska, 1943; LLB. Harvard, 1946; SJ.D., University of Wisconsin, 1958.
1. The Nebraska Legislature created the Nebraska Hall of Fame in 1961. The
law created a commission with power to select persons for the Hall of Fame
and to superintend the commemoration of those chosen. The method of com-
memoration is a bust of the honoree displayed in the State CapitoL
The purpose, stated in the law, is to bring public attention and recognition
to outstanding "Nebraskans." Nebraskans are persons who were born in Ne-
braska, who gained prominence while living in Nebraska, or whose Nebraska
residence was an important influence upon their lives and contributed to
their greatness. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 72-724 to -729.01 (Reissue 1976); NE-
BRASKA BLUE BOOK 535-36 (1976-77).
2. The other honorees are: George W. Norris, Willa Cather, John J. Pershing,
Edward J. Flanagan, William F. Cody, William J. Bryan, Bess Streeter Al-
drich, John G. Neihardt, and J. Sterling Morton. In addition to the above,
Grace Abbott, Roscoe Pound and Mari Sandoz were elected during the Na-
tion's Bicentennial Year (1976). See LB. 670, 1976 Neb. Laws 353. All Ne-
braska Congressional Medal of Honor winners from the Civil War to date are
members by virtue of LB. 1212, 1969 Neb. Laws 2448.
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the story of Chief Standing Bear and, second, to highlight some
basic themes which may be found in federal Indian law.
Standing Bear's life cannot be separated from the fortunes and
misfortunes of his tribe, the Ponca. Hundreds of years ago-a
more exact date is difficult to establish-the Ponca, Omaha, Osage,
Kansa, and Quapaw Tribes were one people. This truth rests not
upon a written record, but upon a solid foundation of oral tradition
common to each tribe. In turn, these five tribes were part of a
much larger native group, commonly called Siouan, which at one
time occupied an immense area east of the Mississippi, maybe as
far eastward as the Atlantic Ocean. These people moved freely
about the United States prior to the appearance of the white men,
and on the eve of Columbus' discovery of the new world, many
Siouan subgroups were migrating generally westward.3
The five named tribes remained together longer than others in
the Siouan group. The first split came when the Omahas and the
Quapaws apparently separated sometime prior to 1500, near where
the Ohio River empties into the Mississippi. After the separation,
the Omahas and Poncas went up the Mississippi, while the
Quapaws went downriver.4 According to tradition, the Omahas
and Poncas followed the Des Moines River to its headwaters and
then wandered northeast. Sioux traditions tell of meeting the
Omaha near the Blue Earth and Minnesota Rivers.
Rituals, ceremonies, and relics confirm that the Omaha Tribe
inhabited a forested area before moving to the Missouri River area.
When this move occurred, the Arikara Tribe lived on the west bank
of the Missouri River in the area later included in Nebraska; Ponca
and Omaha traditions state that the two tribes were still one group
when they drove the Arikara northward. Sometime after this the
Ponca separated from the Omaha. However, details of the separa-
tion are very vague in the traditions of both tribes. Afterwards, the
3. See 1 A. FLETCHER & F. LA FLESCHE, THE OMAHA TRIBE 34-35 (1972).
4. Oral tradition contains two versions of the separation. One relates that the
Omahas safely crossed the river in boats, but a storm blew the Quapaws
downstream. The other is that the crossing was made by people clinging to a
grape vine rope that broke after the Omahas were across, leaving the
Quapaws behind. The Quapaws, misjudging which direction the Omahas
would travel, went downstream on the near side, while the Omahas went up-
stream on the far side. The word "Omaha," comes from the Indian word,
"umon'hon," meaning "against the current" (thus, upstream); the word "Qua-
paw" comes from the Indian word, "uga'xpa," meaning "with the current"
(thus, downstream). 1 A. FLETCHER & F. LA FLEscHE, supra note 3, at 36. See
E. Stabler, Omaha Language Workbook 3 (1980) (unpublished); M. SwET-
LAND, UMONHONIYE OF ELIZABETH STABLER, A VocABULARY OF THE OMAHA
LANGUAGE 129, 142 (Nebraska Indian Press, Winnebago, Neb., 1977). On the
general migration of the Siouan people westward, see P. RADiN, THE WmNE-
BAGO TRmBE (1970).
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Poncas occupied an area near the confluence of the Niobrara and
Missouri Rivers.5
After the Ponca-Omaha separation and before the purchase of
Louisiana by the United States, the Poncas were visited by first
Spanish and then French traders. On September 5, 1804, the Lewis
and Clark Expedition dispatched two men to visit a Ponca village
located close to the mouth of the Niobrara, but they found no "Pon-
carar" (the term for the Poncas used in the Expedition journal)
because the tribe was off on the fall hunt.6
Compared to the Sioux or even the Omaha, the Ponca Tribe
was never large. For example, an 1829 census reported about 600
Poncas,7 and, in fact, between 1800 and 1900 they probably never
numbered more than 800. Factors affecting the tribe's size were
noted as early as 1830 when the famous traveler and artist, George
Catlin, visited the tribe and painted portraits of some Ponca lead-
ers and their wives. Catlin reported a tale of woe related to him by
one of the chiefs he painted-Shoo-de-ga-cha, or Smoke. Shoo-de-
ga-cha attributed the poverty and distress of his tribe to the deple-
tion of the game supply by white encroachment and to hostile
Sioux, Pawnee, Osage, and Konza attacks upon Ponca hunting par-
ties, which were forced to push farther afield for dwindling game.
The Chief also estimated that whiskey and smallpox had already
destroyed four-fifths of his people.8
5. See 1 A. FLETCHER & F. LA FLESCHE, supra note 3, at 41, 78-81; J. OLSON, HIS-
TORY OF NEBRASKA 25-26 (1955); 0. LAFARGE, PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE
AMEImcAN INDIANS 87 (1957). The separation date has been placed as early as
1390 and as late as the middle of the eighteenth century. The Ponca appear
on a map dated 1701, and by 1789 they definitely were living on lands where
the Niobrara flows into the Missouri. The word "Ponca" is old, but its mean-
ing is not known.
6. See 1 HISTORY OF THE EXPEDITION UNDER THE CoMMAND OF LEWIS AND CLAIK
108-09 (E. Coues ed. 1893, Dover Pub. ed. 1965); H. JACKSON, CENTURY OF DIS-
HONOR 186 (1881). Evidently the Poncas could have hunted successfully at
home, because the two expedition visitors killed a buffalo in the deserted
Ponca village. The expedition estimated the Ponca to number only 50 men,
the tribe having been decimated by smallpox and by warfare with the Sioux.
An expedition map of the journey located the Poncas between the Poncarar
River (now Ponca Creek) and the Quicourri River (now the Niobrara River)
and listed the size as "200 Souls." Another map, prepared by Capt. Mer-
iwether Lewis and based on information supplied by "best informed travel-
lers," located the Poncas north of the forks of the Platte River in what is now
western Nebraska. Undoubtedly this was part of their hunting grounds and
the "travellers" could have found them there searching for buffalo and other
game. 2 HISTORY OF THE EXPEDITION UNDER THE COMMAND OF LEWIS AND
CLARK, supra, inside back cover. The same map noted the size as "50 men
and 100 tents." Id.
7. See H. JACKSON, supra, at 186.
8. Id. at 186-89. Smoke (or "Smoker," as one treaty listed him) signed the first
two Ponca treaties (1817 and 1825). The reddish rock from which the Indians
19811
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Until 1871 relationships between the United States and Indian
tribes were formalized in treaties.9 Before treaty-making ceased,
the United States made four treaties with the Poncas. The first two
treaties (1817 and 1825) are unimportant for purposes of this ac-
count, for, in summary, they established peace between the United
States and the tribe, regulated trade with the tribe (largely
through federally licensed traders), and provided procedures for
redressing wrongs done to persons or property by the other side.
Neither of these treaties dealt with Ponca lands.
The third treaty (1858) is the most important for this story be-
cause it ceded a large tract of Ponca land to the United States
while reserving an area for the tribe to occupy. The treaty ceded to
the United States:
[all the lands now owned or claimed by them, wherever situate, except
the tract bounded as follows, viz: Beginning at a point on the Neobrara
River and running due north, so as to intersect the Ponca River twenty-
five miles from its mouth; thence from said point of intersection, up and
along the Ponca River, twenty - miles; thence due south to the Ne-
obrara River; and thence down and along said river to the place of begin-
ng .... 10
fashioned the calumet, or pipe, is named catlinite after George Catlin. The
material is found only in southwestern Minnesota (now Pipestone, Minn.).
The extent of traditional Ponca hunting grounds may be gauged by the tribe's
allegations in a twentieth century Ponca suit against the United States. The
tribe claimed hunting rights to 25,810,000 acres of land in Nebraska and South
Dakota. The same land was claimed by the Sioux, Arapahoe, Cheyenne,
Yankton, and other tribes. This Ponca claim was dismissed for lack of prose-
cution on January 6, 1936. 82 Ct. CL 697. See 2 E. SmrrH, INDIAN TRmAL
CLAiMs 171 (n.d.).
9. Indian treaty-making ceased abruptly in 1871 when the House of Representa-
tives refused to consider appropriations for treaty implementation until it
gained a voice in Indian affairs equal to the Senate. The Senate capitulated,
and Indian treaty-making ended. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194,
201-02 (1975); 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw 66-67 (Univ. of N.M. ed. 1971); D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C. WMKMSON,
FEDERAL INDLN LAw 67-68 (1979).
10. Treaty with the Poncas, 1858, art. 1, 12 Stat. 997 (1859); 2 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN
AFFAS-LAWS AND TREATIES 772 (1904). The area reserved in this treaty for
the Poncas was outside the boundaries of the State of Nebraska, if the north-
ern boundary of Nebraska described in the 1864 Enabling Act is used. The
Enabling Act boundary of Nebraska started at the intersection of 270 west
longitude and 430 north latitude (the northwest corner of present day Ne-
braska) and then proceeded eastward on the 430 north latitude line to where
it met the Keya Paha River, then down its middle to the Niobrara River, then
down the Niobrara River to its juncture with the Missouri River, and then
along the latter river. See Act of Apr. 19, 1864, ch. 59, § 2, 13 Stat. 47 (1864).
However, in 1882 the northern boundary of Nebraska was altered. Act of Mar.
28, 1882, ch. 52,22 Stat. 35 (1882). The new line followed the 430 latitude paral-
lel eastward until that latitude line struck the Missouri River, and then fol-
lowed the Missouri the rest of the way. The 1858 Ponca Reservation would
have been in the State of Nebraska, judged by the altered northern boundary
[Vol. 60:451
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The Poncas agreed to move to the reserved area within one year
after ratification and thereafter were to occupy the reserve as their
"future home."
In return for the Ponca land cession, the United States prom-
ised the Poncas annual annuities which were to continue for 30
years ($12,000 annually for five years, $10,000 annually for ten
years, and $8,000 annually for fifteen years). The Poncas were to
receive $20,000 during the first year after settling upon the reserved
area to be used to build homes, to buy agricultural implements,
and to fence the land. The United States was to maintain one or
more educational institutions for ten years, provided that the an-
nual expense was not to exceed $5,000. In addition, a mill to grind
grain and one to saw timber were to be furnished along with an
interpreter, a miller, a mill engineer, and a farmer. As the Com-
missioner for Indian Affairs explained in his 1858 Report, the objec-
tive was to "colonize and domesticate" the Poncas.n
The Poncas immediately honored the treaty and moved to the
reserved area in 1858. In doing so they abandoned their settle-
ments outside the reserve, intending to give up hunting for an agri-
cultural economy. However, this soon reduced them to a state of
"desperation and destitution,"12 for although the Poncas expected
that the United States would also perform its promises promptly,
the Senate did not act until March 8, 1859, four days short of a year
after the treaty was signed. In the interim, the government had to
feed the Poncas, or the entire tribe would have starved to death.
From the ratification of the 1858 treaty until the mid-1870s, a
conspiracy of human and natural forces seemed determined to to-
tally destroy the tribe. Starvation was a constant threat. The Pon-
cas could not provide enough food by cultivating, hunting, or
gathering to guarantee survival. Hunts were cut short by hostile
Sioux action. In 1860 the Sioux drove off over half the Poncas' hor-
ses. Crops withered and burned in the searing heat of droughts.
For three years in a row, locusts destroyed all Ponca crops. Their
agent had no food and had no money with which to procure food.
In desperation some hungry Poncas visited the Pawnee and
Omaha Tribes while those who remained on the reservation lived
on wild turnips, cherries, plums, and a few roasting ears from their
corn fields.
Despite these conditions the Poncas dutifully kept the peace as
line. All Ponca treaties preceded the admission of both Nebraska (admitted
March 1, 1867) and South Dakota (admitted November 2, 1889).
11. REPORT OF COMNISSIONER FOR INDIAN AFFAIRS, S. Doc. No. 1, 35th Cong., 2d
Sess. 354 (1858). See H. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 189-90.
12. Id. The Poncas' 1858 summer hunt was unproductive, and so were most later
hunts.
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they had promised. They were hungry and often starving, but even
with cattle and sheep belonging to others within their sight they
did not steal or plunder. They often saw herds of cattle and wagon
loads of other goods (flour, coffee, sugar, tobacco) destined for the
Sioux Nation-their western neighbors who had at times attacked
them. Still the Poncas never lost hope nor retailiated.13
The Poncas also suffered from occasional, unprovoked attacks
by whites: a group of soldiers from the Seventh Iowa Cavalry at-
tacked thirteen Poncas while they were returning from the Omaha
Tribe, killing three women and a small girl, and destroying all the
Poncas' equipment and supplies.14 The criminal law was unable to
provide protection to the Poncas. For example, when two Poncas
visiting the Yankton Agency were murdered by a party of Santees,
the guilty Santees escaped punishment when a court quashed the
indictment, ruling that no federal law made such acts by Indians
criminal.' 5
In 1865, the last treaty with the Poncas relocated their reserva-
tion to the east and south of its earlier location. The tribe gave up
most of its 1858 reservation and, in exchange, acquired reservation
lands surrounding the mouths of the Niobrara River and Ponca
Creek.' 6 The treaty stated that the two reasons for this move were
13. For example, their agent reported that he knew "Whole families to live for
days together on nothing but half-dried corn-stalks" even though the same
people were in sight of cattle and sheep owned by white settlers. H. JACKSON,
supra note 6, at 192. W. WELSH, SIOUX AND PONCA INDIANS, REPORT TO THE
MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH, AND TO
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ON INDIAN CIVILIZATION 19 (1870).
14. This attack was colored by frontier feelings toward Indians in general. Sec-
tion 3 of the Ponca Treaty of 1865 awarded the tribe $15,080 for this "spoila-
tion." Iowa volunteers found "fun" in attacking other Indian groups. For
example, Iowa cavalry volunteers thought it a good "joke" to drop a few how-
itzer shells into the camp of some friendly Sioux (Oglala) camped at the con-
fluence of the north and south branches of the Platte. See G. HYDE, SPOTrED
TAnL'S FOLK 87 (1961). Army regulars were away, engaged in the Civil War.
15. This rule was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 1886 when it
freed a Brule Sioux, Crow Dog, from a death sentence imposed by the First
Judicial District of the Territory of Dakota for murdering his chief, Spotted
Tail Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Public dissatisfaction with
Crow Dog's escaping punishment caused enactment of a federal law making
serious criminal activity committed by an Indian in Indian country a federal
crime. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1948)). The constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act was sus-
tained in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The Court held the act
was within the plenary federal power over Indian affairs.
16. Treaty with the Ponca Indians, 14 Stat. 675 (1867). The Poncas surrendered
all of their old reserve west of the line between ranges 10 and 11 W. of the 6th
P.M., Kansas and Nebraska Survey. In exchange they received a new reser-
vation described by reference to the same survey, to wit: all of township 31
N., range 7 W.; fractional townships 32 N., ranges 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 W. and 33 N.,
[Vol. 60:451
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to return to the Poncas their old burial grounds and to return their
traditional agricultural lands. A third motive was to move the Pon-
cas away from attacks from the west. Shortly after moving to the
1858 reservation, the entire tribe had fled down to the Niobrara's
mouth to escape Sioux attacks and was induced to return only
"with the greatest difficulty." After returning, the Poncas had clus-
tered fearfully around the agency buildings, afraid to go out to
farm.17
A year after the 1865 Ponca treaty was ratified, the United
States entered into a treaty with various bands of the Sioux Na-
tion.18 This treaty, often called the Fort Laramie Treaty, was the
culmination of Red Cloud's War against white intrusion into the
Sioux hunting grounds on the east flank of the Big Horn Moun-
tains in Wyoming (then part of Dakota Territory). Article 2 of the
Laramie Treaty created a huge reservation for the Sioux (roughly
all of South Dakota west of the Missouri River), which used the
northern boundary of Nebraska as its southern boundary. At this
time the Niobrara River was the northern boundary of Nebraska.
Thus, all Ponca land reserved in the 1865 treaty which lay north of
the Niobrara River (about 96,000 acres-the bulk of the tribe's
land) was given to the Sioux!
How did this mistake occur? Although no one knows for sure, it
probably resulted from a lapse of memory on the part of the 1868
Laramie Treaty commissioners. The fact that important military
men had participated in the Laramie Treaty negotiations (Lieuten-
ant General William Tecumseh Sherman, and Brevet Major
Generals Harney, Augur, and Terry) dampened enthusiasm for
probing into why land previously reserved for the Ponca was in-
cluded in the Sioux Reservation. There is no evidence that the
Ponca land was extremely valuable or that the Sioux demanded its
ranges 7 and 8 W.; and the parts of township 33 N. and ranges 9 and 10 W.
lying south of Ponca Creek. The treaty also gave the Poncas the islands in
the Niobrara lying "in front" of the other described lands. See the disposition
of "Niobrara Island" in Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, § 21, 25 Stat. 896 (1889).
17. H. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 191. The 1865 treaty was not ratified until 1867.
This delay was very harmful to the Poncas. Uncertainty over ratification hin-
dered permanent improvements (houses, barns, breaking land, etc.) upon
the new reservation and delayed the founding and operation of educational
institutions provided for in the 1858 treaty. The 1858 promise of educational
facilities was limited to ten years. Thus by the time the new treaty was rati-
fied, the educational grant had but one year left. The 1865 treaty also re-
quired the Poncas to use their own funds to reimburse persons already on
the new reservation lands for improvements. The Poncas did this out of their
annuity money. Id. at 195-96.
18. Treaty with the Sioux Indians, 15 Stat. 635 (1869). See, e.g., J. OLSON, RED
CLOUD AND THE SIOUX PROBLEM 58-82 (1965); D. BROwN, FORT PHIL KEARNY
(1962).
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inclusion in the Sioux grant. However, it would be unfair to assign
complete responsibility for this carelessness to the treaty negotia-
tors. The executive branch submitted the Laramie Treaty to the
Senate, and the Senate consented to the treaty without anyone no-
ticing the mistake. Settlement of the Sioux "problem" was of such
great importance to peace in the west that it was easy to overlook a
prior treaty with a small, peaceful tribe like the Ponca.19 Whether
the mistake was careless or intentional was immaterial, for, in fact,
the same land was granted to two different tribes.
The Sioux immediately claimed the Ponca land and found great
delight in using self-help to gain possession of the area. The Ponca
and Sioux were not wholly friendly prior to the mistake, and the
Laramie Treaty gave the Sioux an excuse to raid the Poncas and a
legal argument to justify the action. Thus, the federal government,
by a mistake of its own making, had placed itself in the middle of
warfare between a very powerful and hostile Sioux Tribe and a
very weak, but peaceful and loyal, Ponca Tribe. There is ample
evidence that between 1872 and 1876 Sioux raiding parties often
visited the Ponca lands, destroying crops, driving off livestock, and,
occasionally, killing Poncas.2 0 Brule Sioux usually made up the
19. Even if the 1865 Ponca Treaty was too "new" (having been ratified in 1867) to
be remembered by the United States negotiators, the 1858 Ponca treaty was
not new, and all of the Ponca Reservation contained in it was north of the
Niobrara, and thus within the Great Sioux Reservation. The Commissioner
of Indian Affairs put the following in his 1878 Report: "[By a blunder in mak-
ing the Sioux Treaty of 1868 the 96,000 acres belonging to the Poncas were
ceded to the Sioux. The negotiators had no right whatever to make the ces-
sion." SENATE REPORT ON THE REMOVAL OF THE PONCA INDIANS, S. REP. No.
670, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. (1880) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. An
1880 Senate Select Committee Report state: '"The Committee are [sic] un-
able to find in the Indian Bureau any reasons for thus including this reserva-
tion... [the Ponca reserve] within the limits of the new Sioux Reservation."
Id. The same Report denied that the Sioux made any demand for the inclu-
sion. The Ponca were not notified or consulted. Id. Many discussions of the
mix-up lead one to believe that all Ponca land was given to the Sioux. This
would be true if one means the Ponca Reservation established by the 1858
treaty, because all of that land was north of the Niobrara. It would not be
true of the Ponca Reservation established by the 1865 treaty, because some of
it was south of the Niobrara. The Poncas inhabited the part north of the Nio-
brara and thus occupied land included in the Great Sioux Reservation.
20. See the letters from the Ponca agent to his superiors in Washington in the
Appendix to Hearings of the Senate Select Committee to Examine into the Cir-
cumstances Connected with the Removal of the Northern Cheyennes from the
Sioux Reservation to the Indian Territory, accompanying SENATE REPORT,
supra note 19, at XXI. These letters reported raids on May 3, 1872 (one Ponca
killed); May 17, 1873; all through the month of June 1873; March 20 and July 16,
1874; and June 15, 1876 (one Ponca killed). For an eyewitness account of a
Sioux raid on the Ponca which was called off when an event portended disas-
ter, see L STANDING BEAR, MY PEOPLE, THE Sioux 76 (1928).
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raiding parties, but upon one occasion Oglala Sioux were identified
as the culprits.
The federal agent requested money to buy arms and ammuni-
tion for the Poncas to use for defense, but his request was denied
on grounds of lack of funds. The agent then requested soldiers
from Fort Randall and at least one company of infantry was dis-
patched to protect the Poncas. However, it was such a small force
that its commander was ordered not to divide his twenty men and
thereby risk their annihilation. The agent then requested a loan of
thirty old army rifles to arm the Poncas. General Philip Sheridan
eventually authorized the loan of twenty Springflelds, and the
agent thereupon was able to drill ten Poncas in defensive tactics.2
By 1873 the Poncas were under constant fear of Sioux attacks
and were suffering intensely from food shortages caused by
droughts and grasshopper plagues. To add to their woes, a large
Missouri River flood tore away large parcels of Ponca land, sweep-
ing away many of the buildings which they had laboriously con-
structed. Although their agent reported that the tribe was
generally making progress, these natural and human adversities
caused many Poncas to consider moving away from their reserva-
tion on the Niobrara.
There is ample evidence that the Poncas seriously considered
returning to join their ancient companions, the Omahas. On No-
vember 6, 1873, Ponca and Omaha chiefs met and actually signed
an agreement in which the Omahas promised to sell part of the
Omaha reserve to the Poncas for a fair price so that the Poncas
could move off their Niobrara Reservation. One of the Ponca
chiefs who signed this agreement was Standing Bear-this was the
first appearance of his name upon any official document pertaining
to Ponca history. Why this agreement was never consummated is
impossible to determine. A Senate Committee reported in 1880
that the agreement seemed acceptable to the Poncas, the Omahas,
and the United States, but for some unexplained reason it was
never completed.22 Possibly the source of the purchase funds was
never identified; possibly the federal policy of moving all tribes to a
21. The army rifles supplied were indeed old. They were 50 caliber Spr-
ingfields-not the newer repeating arms which served some Sioux well at the
Battle of the Little Big Horn, nor even the single shot 45-70 caliber breech-
loading Springflelds with which most of Custer's men were equipped. See J.
PARSONS & J. DuMONT, FmEARmS IN THE CUSTER BATTLE (1953); R KAIN, IN
THE VALLEY OF THE L1TrLE BIG HORN 36, 38, 62, 65 (1969); M. SANDoz, THE
BATTLE OF THE L=TE BIG HORN 127 (1978). But cf. J. MONAGHAN, CUSTER 408
(1971).
22. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at V. There is some evidence that the
agreement failed because important Omaha chiefs were absent when the
agreement was made.
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single location, the Indian Territory, conflicted with plans to move
the Poncas to the Omaha Reservation.
There is evidence that Standing Bear moved to the Omaha Res-
ervation despite the lack of formal authorization. On September
30, 1875, the Ponca agent (A.J. Carrier) wrote to his Washington
superior as follows:
I have the honor herewith respectfully to inform you that I have reinstated
Standing Bear as a chief in this tribe, to date from the l1th instant subject
to your approval.
This Indian had been on a visit to the Omahas since last winter, having,
as he alleges, been prompted to leave his own reservation by reason of the
jealousy then existing among the chiefs here, and for fear of the Sioux. He
has always appeared to me to be a good man, and I think would make an
excellent, even an exemplary, farmer if fair opportunities were offered,
where there was no common enemy such as the Sioux to be dreaded.23
After the move to the Omaha Reservation dropped from consid-
eration, discussion surfaced concerning moving the Poncas to the
Indian Territory. Who initiated this shift in destination, or why, is
not entirely clear. In the fall of 1874 the Pottawatomie Tribe (lo-
cated in the Indian Territory) indicated a wish that the Poncas re-
settle near them. Washington, however, informed A.J. Carrier, the
Ponca agent, that no plans were underway for such relocation and
that no funds existed to permit Ponca chiefs to come to Washing-
ton to discuss the move. Carrier did not drop the matter. In 1875
he visited Washington, and on July 30 he conferred with President
Grant about the Ponca move. Carrier later reported that the Presi-
dent stated the Poncas could move to the Indian Territory if they
so desired. At this time Carrier felt certain that Poncas would be
better off to surrender their old lands to the Sioux.
On September 11 and 23, 1875, Agent Carrier held councils with
the Poncas about moving to Indian Territory. A paper was signed
after the last council, with Standing Bear as one of the signers,
stating the Poncas desired to move and requesting that a delega-
tion of their chiefs visit Indian Territory to select a new reserva-
tion. Carrier maintained then, and later, that the paper
represented the unanimous opinion of those present at the coun-
cils. Standing Bear later repudiated the paper-a position ex-
plained on grounds that the Ponca language had no separate word
23. Id. at 397 app. Army officers and agency superintendents arrogated to them-
selves power to decide who should be a tribal or band chief. See, e.g., J. OL-
soN, supra note 18, at 233 (General Crook removed Red Cloud as chief and
installed Spotted Tail) and at 271 (agent's attempt to depose Red Cloud). It
should be noted that some chiefs reciprocated by conducting campaigns to
remove agents they did not like. Id. at 264-85 (detailing the intense struggle
between Oglala Sioux Chief Red Cloud and Indian Agent McGillycuddy).
Standing Bear aided in deposing an agent (Gregory) in the early 1870s. See
SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 187 (testimony of Alfred S. Riggs).
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for land in the Indian Territory (south of Kansas) and that Stand-
ing Bear reasonably thought a move to the Omaha Reservation
was the issue.24 Carrier transmitted the signed document to the
President, but received no response.
However, on August 15, 1876, the President signed an Indian
Appropriations Act containing the following proviso: "Provided
further, That the Secretary of the Interior may use.., the sum of
twenty-five thousand dollars for the removal of the Poncas to the
Indian Territory, and providing them a home therein, with the con-
sent of said band."25 No single reason prompted the Washington
decision to relocate the Poncas in the Indian Territory. Moving all
tribes to one or more central locations was the national policy at
this time. Second, moving the Poncas to placate the Sioux was an
attractive solution to their hostile relationship. Third, Nebraskans
desired no more Indians be moved into the state. Finally, Sioux
City and Yankton business interests wanted the Poncas removed
so that the Sioux agencies could be located on the Missiouri River
because the Sioux agencies served thousands of Indians and such
trade would be very beneficial to anyone able to participate in it.
On the day following the enactment of the above-quoted law (Au-
gust 16, 1876), the Ponca agent J. Lawrence informed the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs that a council showed many Poncas
favored moving, but many others were strongly opposed.
The Ponca removal rested until January 1877, when the Com-
missioner for Indian Affairs summoned Indian Inspector E.C.
Kemble from New York to Washington and gave him written in-
structions about the removal of the Poncas to the Indian Terri-
tory.26 The instructions emphasized the necessity of moving the
24. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 144 (testimony of A.J. Carrier). Carrier
testified that Standing Bear suggested removal and that Standing Bear was
the "most forceful and eloquent" speaker of all the Ponca chiefs. See SENATE
REPORT, upra note 19, at 160 (testimony of Susette La Flesche (In-
shtatheamba-Bright Eyes) for an explanation of Standing Bear's misunder-
standing. Carrier testified that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs told him
Nebraska Senators objected to the Poncas locating upon the Omaha Reserva-
tion, arguing Nebraska had enough Indians already. Id. at 152 (testimony of
AJ. Carrier).
25. Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 289, 19 Stat. 192 (1876).
26. Former Indian Commissioner George Manypenny, who headed a Commis-
sion to obtain further land cessions from the Sioux, wrote to Washington
from Cheyenne on August 31, 1876, to say that he could stop at the Ponca
reservation and arrange for their removal after he finished with the Sioux.
His offer was not accepted. In the fall of 1876, whites generally dictated terms
of agreements with Indians. The Battle of the Little Big Horn was fresh in
the minds of white policy makers as well as the general white population.
See J. OLSON, supra note 18, at 222-30. For the most recent chapter of the
aftermath of the Manypenny Commission's "agreement" with the Sioux re-
lating to the Black Hills, see United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S.
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Poncas because the Sioux agencies were to move to the Missouri
pursuant to a recent "agreement" with the Sioux and because the
tribes could not be located close to each other.27 Kemble was in-
structed to sound out the Poncas, and if they were generally
favorable towards moving, then he was to take not more than ten
principal Ponca men to the Indian Territory for selection of a site
for a new reservation.
Kemble held conferences with the tribe on January 26 and 27,
1877, and was met with a cool reaction to the proposed relocation.
On January 27 he informed Washington the tribe was willing to
give up the old reservation only if the principal men were pleased
with the new site and only if they were allowed to come to Wash-
ington to finish negotiations. Washington replied that such a visit
would be permitted only after those chosen to select a new site had
done so and only minor details of settlement remained. Although
371 (1980). Oppressive as Kemble's handling of the Ponca removal proved to
be, one wonders if Manypenny would have handled it with more, or less,
sensitivity.
27. The recent "agreement" was the document wrung from the Sioux by the
Commission headed by Manypenny. One part specified that the Sioux would
receive their rations and supplies at points on the Missouri River selected by
the President. Another part contemplated moving the Sioux to the Indian
Territory, but Congress deleted this provision. See J. OLsoN, supra note 18, at
231. In September of 1877 the Sioux chiefs conferred with the President in
Washington and secured his approval to select agency sites away from the
Missouri after the winter of 1877-78. However, the President informed the
chiefs they would have to move to the Missouri to receive rations and sup-
plies for the 1877-78 winter because plans for that location were too far ad-
vanced to change. In addition, the President pointed out, the Ponca had
already been moved to make the Missouri distribution possible. Id. at 250-51.
The Brule Sioux under Chief Spotted Tail reluctantly moved to the Missouri
for the winter of 1877-78, and the Ponca agency, then empty because of the
removal of the Poncas, was used by the United States. See L. STA-DING
BEAR, supra note 20, at 89; G. HYDE, supra note 14, at 255. Many of the old
Ponca buildings were occupied by Brule Sioux during that winter-mostly by
"squaw men" and "mixed bloods." Spotted Tail and the "traditionals" deft-
antiy camped almost a hundred miles west of the old Ponca agency, forcing
the United States to haul supplies to them there. Spotted Tail moved east-
ward in the spring to keep better control over the "progressives" camped
around the agency.
Although U.S. officials tried to keep the Brule Sioux on the Missouri, Spot-
ted Tail was adamantly against it. He called Indian Commissioner Hayt, who
came personally to Dakota Territory to persuade him to change his mind, a
"bald-headed liar." See J. OLsoN, supra note 18, at 260; G. HYDE, supra note
14, at 261. Spotted Tail simply announced his group was going to leave, and it
did. All Brules were gone by July 29, 1878.
Thomas Tibbles, destined to play a major role in the fate of Standing Bear,
claimed he visited Spotted Tail prior to the conference with Commissioner
Hayt and advised him to bluff the Commissioner by strong talk. In fact, Tib-
bles claimed his visit to the Brule leader was instigated by General Crook.
See T. TIBBLES, BucKsNm AND BLANKET DAY9 189-92 (1969).
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Standing Bear was present at these conferences, no official report
records any remarks by him.
Inspector Kemble, Ponca agent Lawrence, the agency inter-
preter, and the ten chosen Poncas (including Standing Bear) left
on February 2, 1877, and one week later arrived at the Osage Reser-
vation in Indian Territory. Rev. S.D. Hinman (a Santee mission-
ary) joined the party later. Preparations for the visit to the Osages
had not been made, and many of the Osage chiefs were absent.
The Ponca delegation was discouraged, not only because no seri-
ous business could be conducted in the absence of the Osage
chiefs, but also because of the absence of the ceremonies, feasting,
and other formalities of a solemn nature which were called for by a
visit of another tribe's leaders. In fact, the Ponca delegation con-
cluded that the Osage reception was unfriendly. Washington then
authorized Kemble to show land on the Kaw, or even on the Qua-
paw, Reservations to the Poncas. Thereafter the party left the
Osages on February 15 and visited the Kaws, who were friendly
and offered the Poncas some Kaw land. The Poncas were now very
despondent and desired only to return home to confer with their
people. They refused to consider any more land as possible reser-
vation sites, and the group headed for Arkansas City. From there
Kemble surveyed some other land, but he went alone because the
Poncas refused to leave Arkansas City.
When Kemble returned on the evening of February 19, the Pon-
cas still wished to return home and asked for the means to accom-
plish the trip. Kemble stated that he was not authorized to do so,
but he promised to contact Washington if they would accompany
him to Independence, Kansas. He left them alone to discuss the
matter, but within the hour eight of the ten men left to return to
Dakota Territory; the other two were physically unfit for the taxing
journey.
Kemble was enraged by the action of the eight chiefs. He called
it 'insubordination" and recommended that the departing chiefs
be arrested and confined at Fort Leavenworth. Kemble and the
remaining members of the party left Arkansas City on February 21,
1877. Agent Lawrence and the two remaining Poncas were dis-
patched to the Otoe Reservation, where Kemble hoped they could
intercept the eight departers. Meanwhile, Kemble and Hinman
visited the Quapaw Reservation, and found land there which they
considered to be suitable. The two men then headed for the old
Ponca Reservation in Dakota Territory by way of St. Joseph, Mis-
souri. Kemble reached the Ponca Reservation on March 10, well
ahead of the eight Ponca chiefs who had left the party at Arkansas
City.
The eight Poncas who left from Arkansas City walked to the
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Otoe Reservation, where they arrived on March 7, 1877. After rest-
ing three days, they were given horses, and were able to reach the
Omaha Reservation on March 27. While there they dispatched a
telegram from Sloan, Iowa, to the President, to inquire whether he
authorized the recent events. After waiting several days for an an-
swer which never came, they left to return to the Ponca Reserva-
tion, arriving on April 2, 1877. During the journey the participants
suffered greatly. The Otoe agent said that their moccasins were
worn out when they reached his post and that their feet were
bleeding. They had eaten hard corn they scavenged from the fields
they passed. They had slept in hay stacks to ward off intense cold.
Chief White Eagle (probably the principal chief) sold his toma-
hawk and a red stone pipe to pay a white man to take them to
Wichita.28 In all, the return from Arkansas City to the Ponca
homeland had taken over forty days and had caused great hard-
ships. Within four days after the Ponca chiefs left for home, the
Federal Government made a decision on the matter. On February
23, 1877, Indian Commissioner Smith dispatched the following tele-
gram to Kemble at Independence, Kansas: "Removal of Poncas
will be insisted upon. Spotted Tail and Red Cloud must move this
summer to Missouri River. Their presence will render further stay
of Poncas at old location impossible."29 Washington authorities
first ordered that the Poncas were to be taken to the Kaw Reserva-
tion (communication dated February 26, 1877),30 then later the lo-
cation was changed to the Quapaw Reservation (communication
dated March 7, 1877),31 because of the fact that Kemble's Quapaw
visit had occurred after the first communication.
Even before Kemble returned to the Ponca Reservation, he
knew the departure of the eight chiefs made removal more diffi-
cult. On March 2, 1877, he informed the Indian Commissioner that
troops might now be needed; later events proved him prophetic.
When the eight chiefs arrived home, Kemble summoned them, but
only two came. Kemble reported to Washington that the chiefs,
like the tribe as a whole, were divided on the removal issue. Kem-
ble believed that the half bloods were generally in favor of re-
moval, but that the full bloods were not. He also thought the full
bloods intimidated the half bloods, and the "soldiers" of the tribe
terrorized the full bloods. Kemble even opined that the "soldiers"
28. See Standing Bear's account of this trip in H. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 199-
202. Even if Jackson included the account in her book to stir public indigna-
tion, there is no evidence that Standing Bear did not utter the words she at-
tributes to him, or that he misrepresented the rigors of the journey. See also
SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 195-96 (testimony of Chief White Eagle).
29. SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 64.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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instructed the chiefs before they left on the inspection trip not to
approve any land.
Between April 2,1877, when the eight chiefs returned, and April
19, 1877, when Kemble hastened to Washington to explain matters,
the Ponca Reservation was in turmoil. Kemble contacted Fort
Randall for aid, and its commander dispatched troops. On April 6,
thirty troopers arrived during a council conducted by Kemble; the
meeting broke up when the Poncas scattered. The next day about
ninety persons attended another council and all of the chiefs pres-
ent spoke. According to Kemble, most were willing to move. Chief
White Eagle attempted to shift the destination to the Omaha Res-
ervation, but to no avail. Soon, thirty more troopers from Fort Ran-
dall arrived. Thereafter, the Poncas employed a Niobrara lawyer
(Solomon Draper) to represent them. He requested Kemble to de-
lay until he could present a legal argument about the Ponca treaty,
but Kemble threatened him with arrest for violating federal law:
unauthorized presence upon the reserve. The Poncas then alleged
that Kemble withheld annuities and rations to force obedience;32
in response, Kemble caused the arrest of Standing Bear and his
brother, Big Snake, who were confined at Fort Randall until prepa-
ration for the departure was completed.33
In addition to Ponca resistance, some non-Indians, motivated
by diverse reasons, protested the removal. The infantry com-
mander at Fort Randall petitioned to cancel plans to move the
Sioux to the Missouri River because he feared that "booze" shops
would spring up on the east side of the river (outside the reserva-
tion) which, in turn, would lead to disorders after the Sioux pa-
tronized them. If the Ponca were not moved, then the Sioux could
not be moved and the commander's task would be eased. Rever-
end Riggs, a Santee missionary, wrote to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, arguing the removal would be unfair and pointing out that the
Ponca, unlike the Sioux, were peaceful and made good neighbors.
Other protestors of the removal were the Presbyterian missionary
at the Yankton Agency, the president of the First National Bank at
Yankton, an ex-mayor of Yankton, and the Governor of Dakota
Territory, who discussed the removal with the President, only to
be referred to the Indian Office.34
32. Id. at XII, 163. Kemble denied this charge. Using annuities and rations as
bargaining devices was common practice. When Kemble arrived in January
1877 to effect the Ponca removal, he requested Washington to send the Ponca
annuities quickly.
33. Standing Bear's own description of this incident may be found in H. JACKSON,
s-upra note 6, at 202-03. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 17 (testi-
mony of Standing Bear), and at 113 (testimony of Kemble).
34. See SENATE REPORT, s-upra note 19, app., and at 176 (testimony of Alfred S.
Riggs).
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The protests of local non-Indians only compounded the difficult
situation which faced Kemble. The Sioux move was unalterably
fixed, yet many Poncas were unwilling to move voluntarily. Thus,
some force or pressure would be needed to effect the removal.
Meanwhile, a change of administration in Washington had oc-
curred in March, and support there for the removal turned luke-
warm. But Kemble sought to hold Washington to its prior
decision. Finally, on April 12, 1877, Washington told Kemble to pro-
ceed, coldly noting that soon the Sioux would move to the Missouri
and "if any Ponca decline to go now they will probably follow
soon."
On April 16, Kemble informed Washington that he was going to
proceed across the Niobrara with the willing Poncas, but that force
would be required to move the others. Washington inquired as to
how many Poncas refused to go voluntarily and as to how many
influential men were in the unwilling group. Kemble and the will-
ing Poncas departed and after they were across the Niobrara, and
headed south, Kemble left for Washington on April 19 to explain
the entire matter.
In Washington, Kemble conferred with Commissioner of Indian
Affairs J.Q. Smith, who was unwilling to proceed alone. Both men
consulted Secretary of Interior Carl Schurz, who was also uncer-
tain. Schurz, in turn, requested his Indian Commissioner to confer
with General Sherman, who agreed with Kemble that removal
should be pressed. Secretary Schurz then agreed.35
After Kemble had left the willing Poncas, the agent, Lawrence,
led them to Columbus, Nebraska.36 On April 30, Kemble rejoined
this contingent following his Washington visit, but only after mak-
ing arrangements in Chicago for troops from Fort Sully to be sent
to the Ponca Agency. At Columbus, Kemble found Agent Law-
rence, Agent E.A. Howard (who was soon given the task of dealing
with the Poncas still on the Niobrara), 164 Indians, and 46 wagons.
Kemble moved south with the willing group, passing through Bea-
trice on May 10 and Manhattan, Kansas, on May 24, and the group
arrived at their destination on the Quapaw Reservation, Indian
Territory, on June 12. Although Kemble's contingent did not expe-
35. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMSSION TO THE PONCAS, S. EXEC. Doc. No.
30, 46th Cong., 3d Sess. 50 (1881) [hereinafter cited as PONCA COMMISSION].
36. Kemble was empowered to select the mode of travel and he chose to go over-
land in lieu of Missouri steamboat. The Poncas thus drove their own teams,
pulling wagons loaded with as many of their personal belongings as could be
carried. However much personal property could not be taken: household
goods, supplies, and farm equipment. This was piled in the buildings, and
eventually disappeared-a total loss to the Poncas. In fact, even the logs
from which Ponca houses, outbuildings, and fences were constructed were
used by others.
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rience an easy trip, difficulty with weather and sickness was minor
when compared to the journey that the group of unwilling Poncas
would soon undertake. After delivering the willing Poncas to In-
dian Terrritory, Kemble's relationship with the Poncas ended, ex-
cept for his involvement in the subsequent arguments concerning
the removal.37
37. Kemble's role in the removal was discussed for several years from all angles.
Often he was made out to be the villain, although he had some defenders.
See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 6-13 (minority report). Kemble
appeared before a Senate Committee appointed to investigate the removal,
and he there sparred verbally with Senator Dawes. The discussion centered
mostly on whether the Poncas ever consented to move-a statutory prerequi-
site. The majority report concluded as follows: 'There is not only not a
shadow of evidence that the Poncas ever gave their consent to removal, but
the evidence is positive and overwhelming to the contrary." Id. at XI
Kemble contended that before the inspection trip, the tribe and its leaders
freely and voluntarily consented to go to the Indian Territory. He blamed the
eight departing chiefs, and the local area people who protested the move after
the chiefs returned, for the turn-about in tribal opinion. The refusal of the
chiefs to look at other sites, he thought, was petty and exhibited bad faith.
The local area people, he thought, were intermeddlers worrying about their
own safety if the Sioux moved to the Missouri.
Senator Dawes certainly agreed with the majority report, which said that
Kemble was "totally unfitted for the work devolved upon him," and which, in
a burst of exaggeration, blamed Kemble for the "hardships and sufferings
which have followed ... [the Poncas] since they were taken by the United
States from their old reservation and placed in their present location in the
Indian Territory." Id. at VIII to IX.
Kemble's attackers seldom noted that before the removal he recom-
mended, in strong language, safeguards to prevent hardship and suffering.
For example, on March 2, 1877, he wrote Washington:
[T]hey... [the Poncas] should have the services of a thoroughly
good and attentive physician, and the care of an agent, directed par-
ticularly to their diet and mode of life during the first year or two of
their residence there, at least. Otherwise, to send them into that cli-
mate is to doom a large number of the tribe to inevitable death from
the sudden change.
Id. at 424 app. Unless this were done, Kemble said, the neglect would be
"barbarism equal to that of our wildest savages." Kemble arranged for corn
plantings before the Poncas arrived, and he reported that when his contin-
gent arrived 300 acres were doing fine.
After the Ponca removal and the Standing Bear case became rallying
events for persons seeking to reform federal Indian policy, Kemble was often
cited as a villain, an image he sought to shed. See his exculpatory letter to
Massachusetts Governor Long, who severely criticized Kemble in a Decem-
ber 3, 1880, speech in Boston, PONCA CouMMssIoN, supra note 35, at 46-50.
Kemble submitted some evidence, and offered to provide more, to this Com-
mission, which was appointed by President Hayes to recommend a solution
to the Ponca question. Id. at 50. Wisely, the Commission eschewed delving
into the issue.
From a vantage point of more than one hundred years later, it appears the
two sides differed on the meaning of the consent required by the statute.
Kemble construed the law to be satisfied if the Poncas at any time consented
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Following the departure of Kemble's group from Columbus,
Agent Howard returned to the old reservation, where he held
councils with the remaining Poncas on May 7 and 8. Although the
Indians were in an "ugly mood," Howard finally convinced them to
move to the Indian Territory, and on May 16 this contingent
(mostly full-blood Poncas) crossed the Niobrara; as Kemble later
reported, "the last Ponca turned his face southward."
It is clear that Howard's group did not want to leave their home-
land: Soldiers were present while Kemble held council and some
troops later were used to escort the Indians as far as Columbus.
Both Standing Bear and his brother were arrested and confined at
Fort Randall in order to neutralize their opposition to the removal.
Finally, Ponca families, fearing that force would be used, prepared
for the move. What words Howard or soldiers uttered, and what
they did beyond talking, is unclear from data now available. Sev-
eral years later, reformers intent upon changing federal Indian pol-
icy described the departure in terms of fixed bayonets and threats
to kill or maim.
In what was perhaps the final attempt to delay removal, the
Ponca employed a lawyer, Solomon Draper from Niobrara, to inter-
cede on their behalf with the authorities in Washington. Although
Draper spoke with the Indian Commissioner, the Secretary of the
Interior, General Sheridan, and General Sherman, he could not al-
ter the decision and he was forced to write the Poncas to inform
them that he had failed.38 When this final hope faded, the remain-
to move. He also separated consent into two parts: consent to give up claim
to the Niobrara reservation and consent to a new reservation site. He con-
tended that consent to give up the old reservation was implicitly included in a
consent to move and that, once given, it was irrevocable. Others, for example,
Senator Dawes and the eight departing chiefs, believed Ponca consent to the
new site was required and only then could the statutory consent be obtained.
Kemble's interpretation was colored by his desire to avoid changes in tri-
bal opinion on the removal issue. He was aware that tribal opinion on re-
moval had been divided for many years, not only over whether the tribe
should move, but also over the new location. He learned this on an earlier
visit to the tribe. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 382 app. He and
Ponca agent Lawrence did not want to engage in a fruitless inspection trip to
the Indian Territory, which might result if Ponca removal were conditioned
upon approval of a new site. See PONCA COMMSSION, supra note 35, at 49.
Kemble's concern for speed, efficiency, and unwaivering adherence to a deci-
sion once fully considered and determined did not then, and does not today,
have the same value in Indian culture as in white culture.
38. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 198, 310. Draper fell ill at Ann Arbor,
Michigan, and could not report in person to his clients. Draper's representa-
tion was not appreciated by Kemble and others in charge of the removal.
From time to time his fee (some 30 Indian ponies worth about $10 each) was
mentioned when his role was discussed, but what was wrong with it was not
specified. Draper seems to have suffered no harm from his representation.
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ing Poncas crossed the Niobrara, turned their faces southward,
and began a journey that rivaled the infamous human suffering of
the Trail of Tears of the Cherokees in 1838-39.39
Agent Howard kept a day-by-day account of the journey of the
Poncas, which was later published by the United States and used
effectively by reformers attacking federal Indian policy.4O How-
ard's contingent, numbering over 500, traveled through Nebraska,
passing through Neligh (May 22), Columbus (May 29), Seward
(June 4), Milford (June 6), Crete (June 9), De Witt (June 10), and
through Kansas by way of Marysville (June 16), Burlington (June
30), and Baxter Springs (July 9).
The group encountered bad weather during almost all of the
trip. First, the weather was cold, then later heavy rains made
many roads almost impassable and swollen streams difficult to
ford or cross. By the time the party reached Indian Territory, the
summer heat had become oppressive and insects had become
bothersome. Both people and livestock were exhausted. The trip
was very hard on the children and the elderly. Many Poncas were
sick, and in all nine died on the journey.41
Standing Bear had been released from confinement at Fort
Randall in time to depart with the Howard contingent. Thus, he
and his family suffered the hardships of the journey. Howard's
journal recorded the following:
June 5th. Broke camp at seven o'clock. Marched fourteen miles, and
went into camp near Milford. Daughter of Standing Bear,
Ponca chief, died at two o'clock of consumption.
June 6th. .. . daughter of Standing Bear ... was given a Christian bur-
ial, her remains being deposited in the cemetary at Milford, Ne-
braska, a small village on Blue River. 2
After recognizing the kindness of the ladies of Milford in assisting
in this burial, Howard's journal continuech
It was here that, looking at the form of his dead daughter thus arrayed for
the tomb, Standing Bear was led to forget the burial-service of his tribe,
and say to those around him that he was desirous of leaving off the ways of
the Indian and adopting those of the white men.4 3
39. See DeRosier, The Cherokee Indians: Disaster Through Negotiation, in
FORKED TONGUES AND BROKEN TREATIES 33-71 (D. Worcester ed. 1975);
BARRY, YUNINI'S STORY OF THE TRAIL OF TEARS (1932); G. FOREMAN, INDIAN
REMOVAL (1953); D. VAN EVERY, DIsINHERrrED: THE LOST BIRT GnT OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN (1966); D. BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 7-8
(1971).
40. See H. JAcKSON, supra note 6, at 207-17.
41. A Ponca child who died on May 23 was given a "Christian burial" in the Ne-
ligh, Nebraska, cemetary. The grave site recently has been marked with a
monument.
42. H. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 213 (Howard's account).
43. Id. A similar resolve appeared later in the eloquent speech Standing Bear
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Confused, chaotic, and unsettled would aptly describe the con-
dition of the Ponca for many months after they arrived in the In-
dian Territory. The legal status of their Niobrara lands was
uncertain, and they had no legal claim to any land in the Indian
Territory. Even if the United States could have bought land either
on the Quapaw reserve or farther west, no purchase had been dis-
cussed, let alone consummated. In fact, no one was quite sure
about the Quapaw boundary line. More important threats to the
Ponca's immediate well-being and to their ultimate survival were
the problems of shelter, food, water, and clothing. Agent Howard
expressed his assessment of the situation by stating:
It is a matter of astonishment to me that the Government should have
ordered the removal of the Ponca... without having first made some pro-
vision of their settlement and comfort. Before their removal... an appro-
priation should have been made... sufficient to have located them in...
a comfortable house .... As the case now is ... these people have been
placed on an uncultivated reservation to live in their tents as best they
may.44
The Ponca were very dissatisfied with the land and living condi-
tions on the Quapaw Reservation. Many became ill and many
died. That winter (1877-78) some of the Ponca leaders went to
Washington seeking presidential permission to return to their old
lands. But the Poncas were told to examine land west of the Qua-
paw Reservation and to relocate if they found desirable land there.
In 1878 a delegation selected land northwest of the Pawnee Reser-
vation at the juncture of the Arkansas and Salt Fork.45 According
to Chief White Eagle, their agent Whiteman tried to keep them
from moving to the new site, but some Poncas went to the new
land anyway, and, lacking provisions in the new location, "nearly
starved to death."4 6
Even after all the Poncas moved to the new location later in
1878, they suffered greatly and many more deaths occurred. Few
Poncas, if any, lived in permanent housing. Very few acres were
broken for cultivation and, consequently, not much food was
made at the conclusion of his suit against General Crook, such views formed
a pivotal position in Judge Dundy's opinion in the case.
Near Milford the Howard contingent was hit by a sudden tornado on June
7. Every tent was destroyed, wagons were thrown about like straws, and
some persons were carried 300 yards by the wind. A child died of storm-re-
lated injuries. On June 9 another child died (a niece of Standing Bear's
daughter), and the body was returned to Milford to be interred in the same
grave as her aunt.
44. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 45th Cong.
2d Sess. 496 app. (1877).
45. Standing Bear was present when the President told the Poncas to select a
new site, and Standing Bear assisted in selecting the new site. See T. TIBBLE,
THE PONCA CHIEFS 14 (1972).
46. PONCA COMMIsSIoN, supra note 35, at 16 (testimony of Chief White Eagle).
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raised. Food from other sources was inadequate and sanitation,
particularly a healthful water supply, was neglected. Poncas al-
leged that their agent refused to issue stoves and farming imple-
ments, although they were on hand and available. Reports of the
number of Ponca deaths ranged from a few over one hundred to
two hundred.47
Standing Bear moved to the new location, but he was very un-
happy and despondent over the deaths. Indian Commissioner EA.
Hayt visited the new site in October 1878 and later told Interior
Secretary Schurz:
During my visit... I ascertained that Standing Bear was dissatisfied, but
that he was the only one among the chiefs who showed a bad spirit. He
was constantly grumbling, and held aloof from the other chiefs, and
seemed full of discontent, which he took no pains to conceal, while the
other Poncas were at work. The agent informed me that he expected that
Standing Bear would leave the Agency at the first favorable opportunity.
It was not thought expedient at that time to put him in confinement, as
one chief out of ten or twelve was hardly of sufficient importance to deal
with in that manner.48
In January 1879, Standing Bear and twenty-nine others left In-
dian Territory at night without informing the agent and headed
north in three covered wagons and one spring wagon. The party
possessed twenty dollars in cash and a few rations. Within twenty
days their resources were exhausted and they were forced to beg
for corn from a white man in order to feed their hungry ponies.
When the white man observed the Poncas parching some of the
grain for themselves, he brought them flour, meat, and coffee. The
party traveled through Kansas, and were able to obtain other aid
along the way. On March 4, 1879, in very poor condition, they
reached the Omaha Reservation. 49 The Omahas offered the Pon-
47. A month-by-month tabulation by the agency clerk showed 117 deaths be-
tween July 1877 and December 1880. Figures for two months were missing
and the tabulation did not include, for a 3 month period, deaths which oc-
curred in the large body which about May 1, 1878, left the Quapaw reserve for
the new site on the Salt Fork without permission of the agent. See PONCA
COmmssIoN, supra note 35, at 45. Tribes often were silent or vague about
deaths because those reported affected the amount of food issued.
48. Hayt to Schurz, April 10, 1879, quoted in T. TreBLES, supra note 45, at 47-48.
49. Standing Bear's account of this flight is contained in T. TBaLEs, supra note
45, at 15-16. See aiso T. TMBLES, supra note 27, at 197-98. Standing Bear em-
phasized that the death of his last son in the Indian Territory and his promise
to bury him in the land of his ancestors were major reasons for the flight.
Although the death and ensuing promise may have been the immediate
cause of his disaffection, there is evidence that Standing Bear never intended
to make the Indian Territory his home. He stated that he was told he could
return to live with the Omahas if he did not like conditions in the south and
that he went south because his wife's relatives went. T. TiBBLES, supra note
45, at 13-14.
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cas the use of land for raising food and those who were able to
work entered upon that task.
The arrival of the Poncas on the Omaha Reservation spawned a
series of communications prerequisite to their arrest and return to
the Indian Territory. Messages went from the local Indian agent to
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, then to the Interior Secretary
and finally to the Secretary of War. In turn the War Department
orders came down the chain of command, to General Sherman,
then to Lieutenant General Sheridan in Chicago, then to Briga-
dier-General Crook in Omaha, then to the commander of Fort
Omaha and finally to Lieutenant W.L. Carpenter, of the 9th U.S.
Infantry. Lieutenant Carpenter took four men from his regiment
to the Omaha Agency and arrested the Poncas. The captives were
returned to Fort Omaha, Nebraska, where they were held prior to
returning them to the Indian Territory.50
At this point Thomas Henry Tibbles, an assistant editor for the
Omaha Daily Herald, learned that the Poncas were at Fort Omaha
and visited them on Sunday, March 30.51 Tibbles wrote the only
record of that Sunday meeting, noting he first had to overcome
their reluctance to talk because of a council scheduled with Gen-
eral Crook for the following day. Finally several Poncas, including
Chief Standing Bear and his wife, reviewed the history of the tribe,
particularly its difficulties after being moved to the Indian Terri-
tory. The Indian speakers asked Tibbles questions which he could
not answer.
Why were they imprisoned when they had committed no crime?
Why were they not free to live where they willed?
Why did not the same laws apply to Indians as applied to whites?
Why would it not be better for the United States to permit the Poncas to
farm and raise their own food instead of providing rations for their
50. The arrest was solely an army operation. Indian Office employees kept away
from the scene. Both Poncas and Omahas wept and wailed at the parting.
Many of the Poncas were ill. One Ponca woman was too ill to be moved. One
Ponca, Lone Runner, refused to go voluntarily and he was tied and moved
under guard some distance behind the main body. Standing Bear made a
speech to the lieutenant stating he did not want to go, but he offered no other
resistance. See T. TiBBLES, supra note 45, at 16, 55, 64, 77-79; 25 J. BOURKE,
DIARY 74 (microfilm, original on fie in the U.S. Military Academy Library,
West Point, New York).
51. Tibbles wrote two accounts of his connection with the Ponca case. In one he
stated that the city editor alerted him to the Ponca's presence at Fort Omaha,
see T. TIBBLES, supra note 45, at 18; in the other he stated it was General
Crook who visited him, see T. TIBBLES, supra note 27, at 193. It is possible to
reconcile the two versions: the city editor's contact was at 11 p.m., March 29,
and Crook's visit occurred at 1 a.m., March 30. On this point see T. TiBBLES,
supra note 45, at 141-42 (notes on the text); King, "A Better Way'" General
George Crook and the Ponca Indians, 50 NEB. HIsT. 239, 242-45 (1969).
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subsistence?52
The Indians stated they had long been aware wild game was gone,
never to return, and they had decided farming was necessary. The
Poncas informed Tibbles that Indian policy should be directed to
securing land for each Indian and protecting his claim to that land,
educating adults in the ways of farming, and educating Indian chil-
dren in the same manner as white children.53
After this conference Tibbles returned to Omaha and solicited
the aid of several church congregations and their ministers. One
minister, who knew Interior Secretary Schurz, drafted a telegram
requesting that the Secretary revoke the order to return Standing
Bear's group to the Indian Territory. This began a long struggle by
Tibbles, and soon many others, to aid the Poncas and, more impor-
tantly, to forge federal Indian policy along entirely new lines.
On March 31, General Crook held a council in his office with
some of the Ponca prisoners. Eight whites, including Tibbles, the
only civilian, were present. Chief Standing Bear was the main
speaker for his group. Crook's aide, Captain John G. Bourke, re-
corded the following in his diary:
Standing Bear, the head man, was a noble looking Indian, tall and com-
manding in presence, dignified in manner and very elegantly dressed in
the costume of his tribe. He wore a shirt made of blue flannel, having col-
lar and cuffs of red cloth, ornamented with brass buttons, leggings of blue
flannel, mocassins [sic] of deer skin, and over his shoulders was draped a
beautiful blanket, one half red, the other half blue .... The most striking
feature in his attire was a necklace of claws of the grizzly bear, of which he
appeared highly proud.5 4
The history of the treatment of the Poncas was reviewed at
great length by the Indian speakers as they earnestly sought sup-
port for their desire to return to the old reservation. Although mili-
tary personnel indicated sympathy with the prisoners' plight,
General Crook indicated he could do nothing but obey orders.55
52. Tibbles' account of his Sunday meeting is in T. TIBBLES, supra note 45, at 19-
27. Apparently Tibbles and the Ponca prisoners were the only participants.
53. T. TreBLES, supra note 45, at 19-27.
54. 25 J. BouRxE, supra note 50, at 76-77 (emphasis in original). Bourke's Diary
contains a verbatim account of much of the conference. Tibbles included ac-
counts in both of his books-THE PONCA CHIEFS, supra note 45, at 29-32, and
BuCKsKIN AND BLANKET DAYS supra note 27, at 197-98-but Bourke's account
is the most complete.
55. Bourke's diary reported that Standing Bear pleaded-
Oh my Brothers and my Friends outside. I want you to look at me
and take pity on me, and help me to save my women and children.
My Brothers and Fiends-as I am saying, there is somebody
clamping me down to the ground. I need help to get that man off of
me, so I can stand up. I need help.
25 J. BouRKE, supra note 50, at 83-84 (emphasis in original). General Crook's
position was recorded by his aide as follows:
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After the three-hour conference ended, Tibbles dispatched
items about the Poncas to newspapers in New York, Chicago, and
several other large eastern cities. He also wrote several articles
which appeared in the Omaha Daily Herald-one of which con-
cluded that to send ill Poncas back to the Indian Territory would
be nothing "less than heartless, cruel murder."5 6
Tibbles' dispatches to eastern newspapers produced sympa-
thetic new items, but no freedom for the Poncas at Fort Omaha.
Secretary Schurz had ignored the telegram sent by the Omaha
ministers and had given no orders to free the Poncas. Tibbles de-
cided it was time to use other tactics. As he recounted, he read the
United States Constitution, particularly the newly added Four-
teenth Amendment, and decided to find out if an Indian was "a
man" or "a brute"; whether an Indian "had any rights which a
white man was bound to respect."5 7
Tibbles' initial hurdle-neither he nor the Ponca prisoners had
funds to hire an attorney-was surmounted by persuading a mem-
ber of the bar to serve without charge. Tibbles contacted John Lee
Webster, who agreed to serve provided Tibbles could secure co-
counsel. Tibbles then persuaded A.J. Poppleton to assist.5 8
There was very little time sifice the journey back to the Indian
Territory might start at any time. Although Crook was sympa-
thetic to the prisoners' plight and could delay until the ill prisoners
could travel and their stock was rested, he would have been forced
to obey orders fairly soon. Thus, Webster and Poppleton filed an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States Circuit
It's not our place to give them money; they must get that from Wash-
ington. We will give them plenty to eat while they are here. I know
it is very hard and painful for them to go down and it's just as hard
and painful for us to have to send them there.
Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
56. See, e.g., The Last Indian Outrage, Omaha Daily Herald, Apr. 1, 1879, at 4, col
3.
57. T. TIBBLES, supra note 45, at 33-34. Other passages in this book indicate Tib-
bles focused upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
He analogized the Ponca case to the rights of blacks-a fight in which Tibbles
had previously been engaged. See T. TreBLES, supra note 27, at 29-57. Tibbles
was not totally inexperienced in legal matters. He had "read" law (Black-
stone, Pufendorf and Chitty--the latter he called the "most infernal book that
was ever printed.") in a Winterset, Iowa, law office. Id. at 29, 145.
58. Both lawyers were well-known and experienced. Webster had been Presi-
dent of the 1875 Nebraska Constitutional Convention, see NEB. CONST. art. 17
(Authentication Clauses), and Poppleton was counsel for the Union Pacific
Railroad, see T. TIBBLES, supra note 27, at 199. Tibbles and Webster had both
attended Mount Union College in Ohio, and there is evidence Webster specif-
ically requested Poppleton to be his co-counseL Id. at 147; T. TIBBLES, supra
note 45, at 34-35.
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Court for the District of Nebraska.59
The Application alleged simply that the applicants were Me-
gally deprived of their liberty, that they had committed no crime,
that they were ignorant of the reason for their arrest and confine-
ment, and that they desired the court to inquire into the matter
and order their release. Very importantly, they alleged that they
were "separated from the Ponca Tribe of Indians ... [which was]
located in the Indian Territory." Judge Elmer Dundy issued the
writ on April 8. The original return merely outlined the orders
under which General Crook acted; it was later amended to allege
that the Ponca prisoners had not severed their tribal relationship
nor were they "pursuing the habits and vocations of civilized
life."60
The trial began on May 1 and lasted approximately two days.
The applicants presented three witnesses: Standing Bear, Lieu-
tenant Carpenter, and Willie W. Hamilton, a twenty-two year old
employee at a store on the Omaha Reservation. The defendant
(General Crook), represented by United States District Attorney
G.M. Lambertson, presented no witnesses. The only factual mat-
ter in dispute was whether the Ponca applicants had abandoned or
severed their tribal relationship and had assumed the characteris-
tics of "civilized" life. All three counsel argued the legal points at
great length: Webster opened with about a six hour argument;
Lambertson followed with about a five hour argument; and Pop-
pleton closed with about a four hour argument. 61
59. The application, dated April 4, 1879, is quoted in full in T. TIBBLES, supra note
45, at 36-39. The return is quoted in T. TreBLES, supra note 45, at 39-45. The
application listed 26 Poncas, as did the verification. However only eight
names appear at the end of the application and on the verification. Tibbles
and Lt. Carpenter (the arresting officer) were witnesses. Standing Bear's
name was listed first in all places.
60. T. TIeBLES, supra note 45, at 44. The Poncas' attorneys had difficulty locating
Judge Dundy-one account stated he was engaged in a bear hunt. See T. Tm-
BLES, supra note 27, at 199. Apparently at one time the trial was scheduled
for Lincoln, see T. TIBBLES, supra note 45, at 36; King, supra note 51, at 247;
the writ was actually issued from Lincoln on April 8,1879, and a short hearing
was held in Lincoln on April 30. The trial was held in Omaha. See Daily Ne-
braska State Journal, Apr. 30, 1879, at 2, col. 2. The amendment was added to
the return on the last day of the Omaha trial. General Crook's name ap-
peared on the amendment without his consent. He objected strenuously, on
the ground that he did not believe the facts alleged were true. Judge Dundy
patiently explained to the General that he signed in his capacity as a govern-
ment official and not as a private citizen, but the General could not accept
this legal distinction. Thus, General Crook, the defendant in the proceeding,
never agreed with the facts alleged over his name. See T. TIBBLEs, supra note
45, at 45.
61. A verbatim account of the testimony is contained in T. TreBLES, supra note
45, at 66-90. The arguments were covered in Tibbles' news acounts. See
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When all lawyers concluded, Judge Dundy allowed Standing
Bear to address the court-his remarks were interpreted sentence-
by-sentence. The Chief rose, extended his hand toward the bench,
and for an embarrassingly long time stood in that posture, and
then, according to Tibbles, spoke: "That hand is not the color of
yours, but if I pierce it, I shall feel pain. If you pierce your hand,
you also feel pain. The blood that will flow from mine will be the
same color as yours. I am a man. God made us both."62 Standing
Bear then described his desire to return to the traditional Ponca
home on the Swift Running Water (the Niobrara), and said: "a
man bars the passage .... I ... must obey his orders. If he says
that I cannot pass, I cannot. The long struggle will have been in
vain."63 After a long pause, the Chief looked at Judge Dundy and
concluded: "You are that man."64
Tibbles reported that General Crook leaned forward, covered
his eyes with his hands; women spectators sobbed and tears ap-
peared on the judge's face; then the entire assemblage shouted ap-
proval of the speech. General Crook, followed by the entire
audience, shook Standing Bear's hand.65
On May 12, 1879, Judge Dundy rendered his judgment and re-
leased his opinion.66 He ordered all the applicants "discharged
from custody."61 His opinion first addressed the argument raised
by District Attorney Lambertson that an Indian was not entitled to
invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court. This argument rested
upon two points: first, there was no United States precedent al-
lowing an Indian to invoke federal jurisdiction; second, under Eng-
lish law only citizens were entitled to the writ of habeas corpus
and Indians were "outside" the governmental system established
by and for non-Indians.6 8
Omaha Daily Herald, May 3, 1879, at 3, coL 1; id., May 4, 1879, at 2, col. 1; id.,
May 6, 1879, at 2, col. 2; id., May 7, 1879, at 2, coL 2.
62. T. TIrBLES, supra note 27, at 201.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 201-02.
66. United States ex reL Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879)
(No. 14,891). The opinion was also reported by Circuit Judge John F. Dillon, 5
Dill. 453.
67. There is evidence that Judge Dundy was affected greatly by the nature of the
case. He stated in his opinion that never before had he been called upon to
decide a case "so strong to my sympathy." United States ex rel. Standing
Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. at 695. He also noted that the defendant, General
Crook, "has no sort of sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his
position." Id.
68. Lambertson even objected to Standing Bear's competency as a witness at the
trial, but was overruled. The district attorney, perhaps unwisely, rested part
of his argument upon the Dred Scott case. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1856).
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If the English law was as Lambertson claimed, Judge Dundy
said it was "at a disadvantage when compared with our own." 69 He
conceded Lambertson's point that no Indian had ever before in-
voked the habeas corpus jurisdiction of a federal court, but he
called Lambertson's conclusion that the Poncas were therefore ex-
cluded a "non sequitur."70 Judge Dundy cited the federal habeas
corpus statute's71 language providing that "parties" and "persons"
may seek the writ and concluded that the "comprehensive lan-
guage ... appl[ies] to all mankind .... -72 In words strikingly
similar to those used by Standing Bear, the Judge stated: "I must
hold, then, that Indians are 'persons'...."73
Once jurisdiction was established, the Judge reached the sec-
ond question, which he phrased as: "whether or not an Indian can
withdraw from his tribe, sever his tribal relation therewith, and
terminate his allegiance thereto for the purpose of making an in-
dependent living and adopting our own civilization."74 The right of
a citizen to expatriate himself had long been debated in America,
but in 1868 Congress declared the right of expatriation existed and
equated it with the "natural and inherent right of all people ... to
... the rights of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness .... "75
Judge Dundy easily concluded that Indians possessed the right to
withdraw from their tribe.
The only remaining issue was whether the United States had
power to control the place of residence of Indians who had severed
tribal ties. Judge Dundy could find no statute or treaty conferring
such power upon the United States; he concluded that no "such
arbitrary authority exists in this country."78 Dundy did find a fed-
eral law authorizing federal officials to remove any person from an
Indian reservation "whose presence may, in the judgment of the
commissioner, be detrimental to the peace and welfare of the Indi-
ans. 77 He concluded that the United States could lawfully order
military authorities to remove the Poncas from the Omaha Reser-
vation, but the law required that the military surrender the re-
moved persons to civilian authority, something which had not been
69. United States ex reL Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. at 696.
70. Id. at 697.
71. REV. STAT. U.S. ch. 13, §§ 751-766 (1873-1874).
72. United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. at 697.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 699.
75. REv. STAT. U.S. § 1999 (1878). For discussion of recent issues arising from the
loss of citizenship, see L. TRnBE, AmzmIcAN CONSTrruToNAL LAw 278-80 (1978).
Most recent cases concern the power of Congress to deprive persons of citi-
zenship-not the power of a person to voluntarily surrender citizenship.
76. United States ex rel Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. at 700.
77. Id. at 699.
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done with the Poncas.7 8
The subsequent history of Standing Bear's case is important for
two reasons: first, its impact on Standing Bear and his band; sec-
ond, its impact on broader federal Indian policy. Although many
events relate to both points, the case's history relating to the Pon-
cas will precede discussion of its broader significance.
Dundy's opinion freed the Poncas held at Fort Omaha, but
freed them to do what? To go where? One must remember the
opinion permitted the United States to arrest persons (including
Ponca Indians) who were present without permission on reserva-
tions not their own. After Dundy's ruling, Standing Bear was
warned by his lawyers that he would be arrested if he set foot on
any reservation. However, unidentified government lawyers ap-
parently informed Standing Bear that he could safely return to his
old reservation. As soon as he received this advice, Standing Bear,
according to Tibbles, one morning "unsuspiciously, without a word
to any of us, made a beeline for the Niobrara."79 Upon discovering
this, Tibbles borrowed two fast horses from an Omaha Indian and
with a young Indian, rode 120 miles in eighteen hours, and inter-
cepted Standing Bear south of the Niobrara, where he and his
group were waiting for daylight to cross the dangerous river. The
Poncas were brought back to camp just "outside" the Omaha Res-
ervation.8 0 Later the Standing Bear group occupied land (proba-
bly islands) in, or near, the Niobrara. They remained there until
the final settlement of the mix-up which placed Ponca land in the
Great Sioux Reservation.81
78. Neither counsels' arguments nor Judge Dundy's opinion followed Tibbles' le-
gal analysis. See note 56 supra. Tibbles' idea that the key was the fourteenth
amendment was faulty. That amendment by its very language was, and is,
limited to action taken by, or under the authority of, state power. The vice
holding the Poncas was federal, not state. Tibbles should have read the fifth,
not the fourteenth, amendment. One should not fault Tibbles too much since
his services, even if based upon faulty legal reasoning, were responsible for
filing the case, and no one reading law in Blackstone, Pufendorf, or even the
"infernal" Chitty would learn about the fourteenth amendment!
79. T. TiBBLES, supra note 27, at 203.
80. Id. After the Poncas were released from custody on May 19, Standing Bear,
according to Tibbles, gave his beaded buckskin leggings to Tibbles, his war-
bonnet to Poppleton, and his tomahawk to Webster with an eloquent speech:
Hitherto, when we have been wronged we went to war.... We took
the tomahawk .... and went to kill.
But you have found a better way. You have gone into the court for
us, and I find that our wrongs can be righted there. Now I have no
more use for the tomahawk I want to lay it down forever.
I lay it down; I have no more use for it; I have found a better way.
T. TraLhES, supra note 45, at 114. (Emphasis in original).
81. Helen Hunt Jackson reported in her book, CENTUY OF DIsHNoio, that they
were on an island in the Niobrara "fortunately . .. overlooked when the
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District Attorney Lambertson filed an appeal from Dundy's
judgment, but no appellate court ever considered the case.82 Al-
though freed from the possibility of a reversal, the Standing Bear
Poncas were not very free. They could return to the Ponca Reser-
vation in the Indian Territory, but that offered more sickness and
death. They could not accept the offer of land from their ancient
kinsmen, the Omahas, because of the threat of arrest. The same
fear prevented them from going to any part of the old Ponca Reser-
vation included in the Sioux grant. Indeed, they were a band with-
out a country, forced to live upon aid from private sources, mainly
the Omaha Ponca Committee, chaired by Bishop Clarkson.83
United States... took.., possession of the rest... and presented it to the
Sioux." H. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 369 app. The island may have been
south of the thalweg (the middle of the main channel of current) of the Nio-
brara, and thus within Nebraska and outside the Great Sioux Reservation.
Solomon Draper, the lawyer from Niobrara who tried to prevent the 1877 re-
moval, testified in March 1880 that the Standing Bear band was located on the
Niobrara, in a willow thicket, two miles from.Niobrara on land belonging to a
"Mr. Hullihen." See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 313 (testimony of Solo-
mon Draper).
82. Secretary Schurz claimed he could not agree with the legal points argued by
Lambertson, so he advised the Attorney General, who then ordered the ap-
peal dropped. See EL JACKSON, supra note 6, at 362 app. On the other hand,
the Federal Cases Reporter contains the following note appended to Dundy's
opinion:
At the May term, 1879, Mr. Justice Miller refused to hear an appeal
prosecuted by the United States, because the Indians who had peti-
tioned for the writ of habeas corpus were not present, having been
released by the order of Dundy, District Judge, and no security for
their appearance having been taken.
United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. at 701. Webster and
Poppleton reported to the Omaha Ponca Committee on July 13, 1880, as
follows:
[T]he U. S. District-attorney took the case to the United States Cir-
cuit Court... by appeal, and about May 19th, upon hearing before
Mr. Justice Miller, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, was there continued, and on January 5, 1880, the ap-
peal was dismissed on the motion of the U. S. District-attorney.
H. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 373 app. Thus, even if the United States had
desired an appellate review, mootness might have prevented it.
83. The other members of the Omaha Ponca Committee were: Rev. A.F. Sherrill,
Rev. WL Harsha, Leavitt Burnham, W.M. Yates, and P.L Perine. See H.
JACKSON, supra note 6, at 370 app.
There is evidence that the Santee Agency, east of the old Ponca Reserva-
tion, was authorized to give supplies to the Standing Bear Poncas, but Tib-
bles advised against it, fearing acceptance would make them "reservation"
Indians and thus subject to federal power. Clark, Ponca Publicity, 29 Mss.
VALLEY HIST. R. 495, 504 (1943). See Report of Santee Agent Isaiah Lightner
in REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, HJ ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 46th
Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1879); PONCA COMMIssION, supra note 35, at 38 (testimony
of David Le Clair).
Schurz, of course, did not agree with Dundy's decision. He said: "If judi-
19811
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From the date Standing Bear's group was released (May 1879)
until the fall of 1880, Tibbles, the Omaha Ponca Committee, and
others struggled to reunite the entire Ponca Tribe on the old Nio-
brara Reservation. Others, for example, Secretary Schurz, Indian
Commissioner Hayt and their supporters, struggled to permit the
Sioux to retain the Niobrara land and to compensate the Poncas
for the old reservation and for other wrongs which occurred during
the 1877 removal.
Shortly after Dundy's decision, Tibbles and the Omaha Com-
mittee dispatched the Omaha Chief, Iron Eye, and his daughter,
Bright Eyes, to the Indian Territory to visit the woman's uncle,
White Swan, and report on the condition of the Poncas still in In-
dian Territory.8 4 They reported that living conditions were very
poor and that the Poncas there desired to return to the Niobrara.
Tibbles, with Henry Fontanelle as interpreter, visited the Poncas
in the Indian Territory in June 1880. Tibbles instructed them not to
cial proceedings should result in spreading among the Indians the impres-
sion that they can leave their places of abode and roam about at pleasure, the
effect would only be disastrous to them." REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
I.ERIOR, supra, at 22.
Military commanders above General Crook were not at all pleased with
Dundy's decision. General Sherman wrote the Secretary of War on May 20,
1879, as follows:
Inasmuch as Judge Dundy has released from custody the Ponca Indi-
ans who escaped from their agency, where they were fed and main-
tained by the Indian Bureau, I think it would be fair to allow him in
his charity to feed and clothe them. They are, in fact, paupers turned
loose on the community by him, and he should assume the task and
expense of their maintenance. If the Ponca Indians prefer to rely on
him, I suppose the army can well allow him to assume that function.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 480 app. The lack of logic in the view that
federal judges should be responsible for the needs of persons they release
from custody in habeas corpus proceedings says little for military reasoning
and much about the intensity of the military's feelings about the Standing
Bear decision.
Dundy predicted this aftermath. He wrote in his opinion that he would
decide the case "without reference to consequences or criticisms, which,
though not specially invited, will be sure to follow." United States ex rel.
Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. at 698.
84. Iron Eye was Joseph La Flesche, Bright Eyes was Susette La Flesche, and
White Swan was Frank La Flesche. See T. TiBBLES, supra note 27, at 205. The
La Flesche family was very important in the history of the Omaha Tribe. See
A. FLETCHER & F. LA FLESCHE, supra note 3. Bright Eyes (Inshtatheamba)
was involved intensely in both the Ponca incident and in the later struggle to
reform federal Indian policy. Before she and her father inspected conditions
of the Poncas in Indian Territory, she had assisted the Ponca cause, writing
letters on their behalf. Later she worked tirelessly for federal policy reform.
Tibbles and Bright Eyes were married June 29, 1882. She was present with
her husband at the Wounded Knee episode in South Dakota in 1890, and she
helped nurse the Indian survivors. She died in 1903. See T. TiBBLES, supra
note 45, at 129-37; T. TreBLES, supra note 27, at 8, 294, 300-16.
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sign any paper pertaining to their Niobrara lands. Later, when he
tried to see the chief of the Nez Perce, he was arrested and re-
moved from the Indian Territory. He obeyed attorney Webster's
advice to return to Omaha.
Secretary Schurz and the military thought Tibbles was a nui-
sance and a threat and used their power to insulate him from the
Poncas, other tribes in the Indian Territory, and tribes in South
Dakota. Tibbles urged the Poncas in the south to steal away in
small groups as Standing Bear's band had done. He assured them
they would be given aid and, if necessary, protection by the courts.
The Poncas in the Indian Territory did not understand this method
of proceeding and were fearful of arrest if they left. There is evi-
dence that some federal officials attempted to stop Omaha Indians
from communicating with Ponca friends and relatives in the south;
other federal officials asserted the legal position that property,
such as wagons and horses, furnished the Ponca remained United
States property and could not be taken off the reservation. 85
After the successful conclusion of the habeas corpus suit, Web-
ster and Poppleton filed suits in the federal courts of both Ne-
braska and South Dakota seeking to establish the superiority of
the Ponca title to the old reservation. Two suits were filed in each
85. See Chief White Eagle's letter, which Bright Eyes brought back from her trip.
T. TiBBLES, supra note 45, at 118-21. Tibbles' version of his trip with Henry
Fontanelle is in T. TIBBLES, BucKsKIN AND BLANKET DAYS, supra note 27, at
224-35. See White Eagle's testimony at an 1880 Senate Committee hearing
examining the Ponca case, SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 194; White Ea-
gle's testimony before the Special Presidential Commission to the Poncas,
PONCA COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 19; id. at 29 (testimony of Rev. J. Owen
Dorsey, Indian missionary before the same body, detailing his letter-writing
for the Omahas and why he stopped); id. at 42-43 (letter from W. Whiting,
Ponca Indian Agent, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs ILE. Trowbridge,
dated June 24, 1880, describing Tibbles' visit to the Poncas, and the Commis-
sioner's June 28, 1880, reply ordering Tibbles' arrest if he were found on the
reservation). Secretary Schurz's position was that the Poncas were better off
in the Indian Territory, that efforts to induce them to run away were i-ad-
vised, and that he was alarmed that efforts to get the Sioux to leave their
reservations were occurring. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
supra note 83.
The Nez Perces visited by Tibbles had as much, or more, trouble in the
Indian Territory than did the Poncas. After they surrendered on October 5,
1877, in Northern Montana, 431 were imprisoned at Fort Leavenworth. In July
1878 those still alive (410) were located on the Quapaw Reservation, where
about one-fourth died. Their leader, Chief Joseph, visited Washington and
secured permission to move to a new location; he chose one northwest of the
Ponca. The Nez Perce desired to return to the Pacific Northwest as much as
the Ponca desired to return to the Niobrara. Tibbles sought to nourish this
desire by his visit. Eventually (1885) all Nez Perce returned, but to two differ-
ent reservations: Lapwai in northern Idaho and Colville in Washington. See
H. HowARD, SAGA OF CHIEF JOSEPH 339-58 (1978).
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state; one naming the Sioux Nation as a defendant, and one nam-
ing Chief Red Cloud, individually and as head of the Sioux Nation,
as a defendant. The Nebraska case against Chief Red Cloud re-
sulted in a judgment for the Ponca Tribe on December 3, 1880.86
However, by then, extra-judicial events which eventually settled
the Ponca claim to the old reservation were underway.
Prior to Standing Bear's flight from the Indian Territory and his
subsequent habeas corpus victory, all Poncas were located in the
Indian Territory. Many were dissatisfied, even after the tribe se-
lected and moved to a new location away from the Quapaw Reser-
vation. However, Washington officials hoped the Poncas' living
conditions would improve and they would stay. The Indian Bu-
reau, supported by Schurz, urged Congress repeatedly to appropri-
ate money to pay the Poncas for their land and property lost by
relocation in the south and to buy the Indian Territory land the
Poncas occupied. After Standing Bear's flight and court-ordered
freedom, the tribe was split, one group attempting to regain control
of the old reservation and the other staying in the Indian Territory,
not entirely happy, but concerned about its fate if it left.
Persons in support of restoring the Poncas to their old reserva-
86. On December 3, 1880, Judge Dundy found that the Ponca Tribe had a legal
estate in the lands claimed (those located in Nebraska) and that the Sioux
Nation had wrongfully kept the Ponca Tribe out of possession. He ordered
that the Ponca Tribe recover possession. Justice at Last, Omaha Daily Her-
ald, Dec. 4, 1880, at 8, col. 4. Bourke clipped this account and placed it in his
diary.
A status account of the cases was given to the Omaha Ponca Committee
by Webster and Poppleton on July 13, 1880. See H. JACKSON, supra note 6,
372-74 app. The two Nebraska cases were filed on April 3, and May 18, 1880;
the South Dakota cases were filed on May 20, 1880. Service on the defendants
was secured only after great difficulty. There is evidence that Spotted Tail
successfully avoided service, maybe with the assistance of the Rosebud
agent, who feared disturbances if the Ponca won back their old reservation.
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, 486 app.
The habeas corpus action broke new legal ground-so new that Lamber-
ston used that fact to support his objections to the court's jurisdiction. But
the Ponca suits against Red Cloud and the Sioux Nation not only lacked solid
precedent, but also presented difficult issues with widespread significance.
They raised such issues as: Could one tribe sue another tribe without the
latter's consent? If this were not possible because of sovereign immunity,
could the Ponca Tribe sue a Sioux tribal official? Was Red Cloud the proper
official to represent the Sioux Nation? Was the United States an indispensa-
ble party-defendant, in view of its interest, both as trustee for both tribes and
as a party to the Ponca and Sioux Treaties? What kind of title did the Ponca
obtain by their treaty? Which treaty, the earlier or the later, settled title to
the land? Many of these issues were later decided, but Poppleton and Web-
ster were not involved in those cases. See D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C.
WnicNsON, supra note 9, at 258-61. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49 (1978); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v.
Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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tion secured the introduction of a bill to accomplish this aim.
These persons either assumed the Ponca title was superior to that
of the Sioux, or accepted reports that the Sioux and Ponca had set-
tled that issue by some sort of "treaty" or "agreement." 87 One
such bill (Senate Bill 1298) was referred to a Senate Select Com-
mittee, which conducted a lengthy hearing and issued a full report
concerning Ponca history, the Standing Bear case, and future In-
dian policy. Standing Bear (with Bright Eyes as interpreter) was
the initial witness, followed by Tibbles and many others. The most
active committee member was Senator Dawes from Massachu-
setts. Secretary Schurz appeared and admitted that when he be-
came Secretary he was not well informed on Indian affairs and that
had he known in 1877 what he later discovered, he would not have
ordered the Ponca removed.8 8 This bill did not reach the Senate
floor, and congressional efforts to solve the Ponca matter were ap-
parently stalemated.
As early as June or July of 1880, the Poncas in Indian Territory
expressed a desire to settle matters. Their agent (Whiting) told
them to discuss it among themselves and reach an independent
conclusion. On October 25, twenty Poncas sent a letter to the Com-
missioner asking permission to travel to Washington to relinquish
87. Facts concerning the Sioux-Ponca peace efforts are difficult to find at this
date. No written document appears to have survived, or maybe none was
ever prepared. The best conclusion, based upon available evidence, is that
the Sioux might have agreed several times to permit the Poncas to "occupy"
the old Ponca reserve, but the occupancy was akin to a "tenancy at will," and
the Sioux wanted payment from the United States if the Ponca title were to
be as good as it was before the 1868 mix-up. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra
note 19, at 122 (testimony of Bishop William Hare); id. at 153 (testimony of
Ponca Agent A.J. Carrier); id. at 216 (testimony of White Eagle); id. at 284
(testimony of Edwin J. Brooks, Chief Clerk of the Indian Office, Washington,
D.C.); G. HYDE, supra note 14, at 143 if.; PONCA CoLumauSioN, supra note 35, at
31-32. Some of the Standing Bear band apparently felt they had a paper from
the Sioux granting title, but the paper they produced was simply a pass to
visit the Sioux. Another Ponca witness testified. 'They gave us the land in
council, but gave us no paper." Id. at 40 (testimony of Smoke-maker).
Even if the Sioux had granted title back by a legal instrument, it probably
would have been void under the Indian Nonintercourse Act, Act of June 30,
1834, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 730 (1834) (current version at 25 U.S.C. 177 (1976)).
See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y.
1977).
88. At this time the Commissioner was pushing a plan to award the Poncas
$140,000, $120,000 of which was payment for the old reservation (96,000 acres
at $1.25 per acre) and the balance ($20,000) was payment for other removal
damages. The $140,000 would be expended as follows: $48,389.46 to purchase
the new reservation from the Cherokees (101,894 acres at 47.49 cents per
acre); the balance ($91,610.54) invested at 4% would return $3,664.42 each year
to the Poncas. Obviously this plan did not contemplate Standing Bear's
group living on the old Ponca Reservation.
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their rights to the old reservation and secure title to the new re-
serve. On November 9, permission was granted, and on December
22 ten Ponca headmen signed an agreement in Washington ac-
cepting $140,000 as payment for the old Niobrara Reservation, prop-
erty lost in the removal, and spoilations caused by Sioux attacks.
Concurrently with these events President Hayes became in-
volved in the matter. On December 18, 1880, the President ap-
pointed a special Commission to investigate the Ponca case and to
report to him its recommendations. The members were General
Crook, General Miles, William Stickney, and Walter Allen. The
Commission met with the Ponca headmen then in Washington on
December 24; held hearings on the Ponca Reservation in the In-
dian Territory on January 5 and 6,1881; and met Standing Bear and
his followers in the "Academy of Music" at Niobrara City, Ne-
braska, on January 11 and 12.
The Commission found that the Southern Ponca desired to stay
on the Indian Territory reservation while the Northern Ponca de-
sired homes on the old reservation. The change in Southern Ponca
opinion was caused by several factors. First, since the beginning
of 1880, living conditions had improved immensely. One of their
agents (Whiteman) had been removed for dereliction in perform-
ing his duties. During his tenure, farming efforts lagged and per-
manent housing failed entirely. He was removed on the last day of
1879 by Indian Inspector Pollock. By February 1880, Pollock had
sixty-nine houses constructed, and by May of that year Chief
White Eagle reported that none of his people lived in tents. Sec-
ond, the health of the tribe had improved, no doubt due as much to
improved sanitary conditions 89 as to acclimatization. Third, the
Poncas decided a move to a new territory would be harmful to
their own efforts to improve their condition since each move set
back housing and farming efforts. Fourth, some of the adversities
experienced in the north were absent in the south, for example,
Missouri River floods and grasshopper devastations. Finally, they
did not receive the help they expected from the group which aided
Standing Bear. Only a few followed Tibbles' advice to slip away
unannounced.
The Northern Ponca, on the other hand, were content with liv-
ing on the old Ponca Reservation. They claimed it still existed and
considered their own negotiations with the Sioux to have settled
the title mix-up. The Sioux were now friendly; some had intermar-
ried with the Ponca.
Standing Bear was the leader of the Northern Ponca, and he
89. See C. BARNEs, THE SOD HOUSE (1970), in which the author assigned im-
proved sanitation as the reason for improved health and declining death rates
on the frontier.
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spoke long and eloquently during the hearings at Niobrara City.
However, his speeches contained traces of bitterness and anger,
against the United States for its removal actions, against the Secre-
tary of the Interior Schurz, and against the Southern Poncas' relin-
quishment of rights to the old reservation. After the hearings it
was evident that Standing Bear and his followers would do nothing
to make Chief White Eagle's hope that the Poncas would reunite in
the south a reality; nor would the Southern Poncas return to their
old homeland.90
The Commission reported to the President on January 25, 1881.
It recommended:
(1) Each Ponca man, woman, and child should be allotted 160
acres of land, either in the north or the south, as the allottee
wished. The title was to be inalienable and not taxable for thirty
years after date of the patent.
(2) $25,000 should be expended for agricultural implements,
seed, and stock-$5,000 of this for the Northern Poncas and the re-
90. See Chief White Eagle's answer to Allen's inquiry whether it was right to
sign away the old reservation if Standing Bear wanted to stay there: "We did
not think about Standing Bear. We were hoping that he would come back.
He is but one chief up there. We are many chiefs and many people down
here, and we hoped he'd come back here ...." PONCA COMMaSSION, Supra
note 35, at 20. Standing Bear stated to the Commission: "I wish to take back
my own people from the Indian Territory. I wish them to live." Id. at 31. The
Commission encouraged Chief White Eagle to accompany it to Niobrara City,
but he demurred, saying he was "very tired and you seem in a great hurry. I
can't go now." Id. at 20. Chief Standing Buffalo stated, "I am sick. White
Eagle can attend to this business." Id. at 21. White Eagle desired to send a
letter instead, but General Crook said that would not do. The Commission
permitted the Southern Ponca to council, and they selected two to go along.
Hairy Bear and Cheyenne.
Before the hearings at Niobrara City, Standing Bear warmly greeted Hairy
Bear and Cheyenne at the "Hubbard House," the best in Niobrara City, by
kissing them, but he merely touched cheeks with Peter Primeaux who was
the interpreter for the other two. Primeaux was an Indian policeman, and the
shooting of Big Snake, Standing Bear's brother, bothered Standing Bear. See
38 J. BoURKE, supra note 50, at 980.
Hairy Bear informed the Commission and the listening audience that if
Standing Bear returned south, "White Eagle would yield the head position in
the tribe to him." PONCA CoMMIssIoN, supra note 35, at 34. Cheyenne also
spoke in conciliatory terms, but Standing Bear ended the discussion, saying,
"I have no other words to say to them (meaning the Poncas who had come
from Indian Territory.)" Id. at 35.
When General Crook observed the gulf between the two factions widen-
ing, he suggested they meet and talk. That night, Bourke's diary recorded, a
huge dance was held and drums kept everyone awake until the early morning
hours of January 12. The gulf between the two groups was not lessened; the
next day Standing Bear said he would not "give them... [the three envoys
from the south] any word... ." Id. at 39.
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maining $20,000 to be divided among the families of the entire
Ponca tribe (proportional to the size of the family).
(3) $5,000 should be expended for housing for the Northern
Poncas and $5,000 for providing them a school house.
On February 1, 1881 President Hayes accepted the Commis-
sion's plan of settlement and presented to Congress the Commis-
sion's report and a verbatim transcription of all testimony taken by
it.91
Congress soon appropriated $165,000 to be expended as follows:
For the Indian Territory Poncas:
(1) $50,000 to purchase 101,894 acres from the Cherokees.
(2) $10,000 to purchase cattle and draft animals.
(3) $10,000 in per capita payments.
91. The events immediately preceding and following appointment of the Com-
mission are fully documented in the Commission's record, PONCA COIVs-
SION, supra note 35, as follows: Letter from the Ponca headmen requesting
permission to come to Washington, at 41 app. (Item A); Commissioner's let-
ter granting permission, at 42 app. (Item B); agreement signed in Washington
by Southern Ponca Chiefs, at 18; President Hayes' appointment of the Com-
mission, at 5, 13; testimony given in the Indian Territory, at 17-27; testimony
given at Niobrara City, at 30-41; majority report of the Commission, at 5-6;
minority report (by Walter Allen), at 6-13; President Hayes' submittal
message, at 1-4. Hayes' message is also in VII J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 630-34 (1900).
Crook's long-time aide, Captain John G. Bourke, was authorized to accom-
pany the Commission. His personal diary records several relevant facts ab-
sent from the Commission's official report. Bourke recorded that one
Northern Ponca's reference to Secretary Schurz as the "Dutchman with the
eye glasses" was not included in the official transcript. There is no doubt that
the Northern Poncas did not like the Secretary, including, probably, Bourke
himself. Standing Bear at one point provoked laughter from his followers
when he said to the Commission, "If the Secretary is sick or foolish, I hope
you'll act as physicians and treat him .... " 38a J. BouRKE, supra note 50, at
97. PONCA COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 31, does not record the laughter.
Bourke's diary recorded that before the Niobrara hearings started the offi-
cial party visited the Standing Bear camp located on a large island in the
Niobrara River a few miles from town. The Indians numbered about 115 per-
sons in 28 families. Standing Bear later estimated that the Northern Poncas
numbered at least 177. Apparently quite a few fled to other tribes on the eve
of removal and joined Standing Bear when he returned. A few left the south-
ern reservation after Standing Bear's court triumph and joined him. On the
day of the visit the group was distributing blankets received from the Omaha
Ponca Committee; some were housed in teepees and some in log houses.
The heavy South Dakota snows encountered by the Commission in Janu-
ary 1881 contributed to a large Missouri River flood, which caused extensive
damage at Yankton several months later. The Nebraska village of Green Is-
land across the river from Yankton was entirely swept away. Vermillion was
so heavily damaged its inhabitants permanently removed to higher ground.
See W. HuRT & W. LASS, FRONTIER PHOTOGRAPHER 119-25 (1956). Thus white
settlements suffered from the power of the same river which earlier had
swept away Ponca land and buildings.
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For the Dakota Poncas (Standing Bear's band):
(1) $5,000 to construct dwellings.
(2) $5,000 for school purposes.
(3) $5,000 for agricultural implements, seed and livestock.
(4) $10,000 in per capita payments.
For the benefit of all Poncas in both groups:
(1) $70,000 as a permanent trust fund-the interest (5% per annum)
to be divided annually among all Poncas. 92
Neither President Hayes' Commission, nor Congress' law pro-
vided an answer to a major issue: Where were the Standing Bear
Poncas going to live? The Commission recommended and Con-
gress ordered that all Poncas be given land in severalty in either
the old or the new reservation, as they chose; however, much of the
old reservation was still part of the Great Sioux Reservation. As
the Secretary reported, no one could build new dwelling houses for
the Northern Poncas because they had "as yet no settled title to
any land.... ."
In August 1881 representatives of the Oglala, Brule, and Stand-
ing Rock Sioux traveled to Washington and agreed in writing to
cede to the United States land located in the old Ponca Reserva-
tion sufficient to equal 640 acres for each Northern Ponca head of
family and unmarried male twenty-one years or older.9 3 Now a
body of land existed from which the Northern Ponca (or for that
matter any Ponca) might select land for allotment in severalty.
However, nine years elapsed before the Northern Poncas re-
ceived allotments in severalty on the old Ponca Reservation. This
delay was attributable to efforts of the United States to reduce the
size of the Great Sioux Reservation. Finally this reduction was ac-
complished by an 1889 law which created six reservations in South
Dakota (Pine Ridge, Rosebud, Standing Rock, Cheyenne River,
92. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 132, 21 Stat. 422 (1881). Rather ironically, Secretary
Schurz resigned on March 4,1881, just one day after this action initiated set-
tlement of a matter which brought him much grief and criticism.
93. The agreement may be found in REPon'r OF T=E SECRETARY OF INTERIOR, H.R.
ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40 (1881). Omaha and Winnebago
delegations were also brought to Washington, possibly to be asked for a land
cession if the Sioux refused. Brule Chief Spotted Tail was selected by his
tribe to go (August 5, 1881), but he was assassinated by Crow Dog just before
the group departed. See G. HYDE, supra note 14, at 299-300. White Thunder
represented the Brules; Red Cloud, the Oglalas. It will be noted that the
Sioux received no consideration for the cession. Red Cloud dominated the
meeting and was in a generous mood. One wonders whether the United
States would have obtained the cession as easily, or as cheaply, if Spotted
Tail had been the Brule spokesman. See J. O.SON, supra note 18, at 275.
White Thunder was later killed by Spotted Tail's son in part of a bitter Brule
power struggle. There is no evidence that the Ponca matter was particularly
divisive, but it was a governmental decision facing Brule leadership, and thus
a part of the background. See G. HYDE, supra note 14, at 298-308.
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Crow Creek, and Lower Brule). The law also provided for other
groups of Indians in Nebraska and South Dakota (e.g., Santee,
Ponca, and Flandreau). The law provided allotments for the Ponca
were to be selected in the following amounts: (1) each head of
family-320 acres; (2) each single person over eighteen-160 acres;
(3) each orphan child under eighteen-160 acres; and (4) every
other person under eighteen-80 acres. 94
Finally, on August 26, 1890, Ponca Sub-Agent James E. Helms
wrote: "Within the last month or six weeks allotments were made
to the Ponca Indians in severalty."95 He also reported:
Some 60 of the Poncas, with Standing Bear at their head, ran away from
their reserve in the early part of last spring .... About one-half of them
have now returned and promise to remain and cultivate their farms. I feel
that Standing Bear alone is responsible for this trouble.9 6
The agent reported that while this group absented themselves
from the reserve the allotments were made and Poncas who had
remained "changed their selections in order to get the improve-
ments and in some instances the superior land that was left by
Standing Bear's party, believing that the absent ones would not
return to claim the abandoned homes." The agent concluded:
Standing Bear is a shrewd, cunning savage, one who, if his intellect was
directed in a channel to benefit his people, could do much good; but as he
now is he is the only one of the Ponca band who persists in the old savage
way. He still has two wives. It may be that he will change for the better,
as his last trip has resulted so disastrously to his following. I think his
influence over the Poncas is at last about gone.9 7
94. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, § 12,25 Stat. 892 (1889) (Section 13 pertained to the
Ponca); cf. Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch. 206, § 13, 25 Stat. 99 (1888) (amount of land
in the allotments fifty percent less).
For the story of United States negotiations with the Sioux to obtain fur-
ther land cessions during this period, see J. OLSON, supra note 18, at 286308
(history of ill-fated "Edmunds Commission"), and at 308-19 (efforts of the
"Foster Commission").
The Ponca allotments on the old reservation totaled 27,235.90 acres. See
Ponca Tribe v. United States, 183 Ct. CL 673, 687 (1968). The allotments were
subject to twenty-five-year restraints on alienation. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch.
405, § 10, 25 Stat. 891 (1889). The restraint was continued until the effective
date of the 1934 Indian Reorganizaion Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934), by Exec.
Order No. 2374 (1916) and Exec. Order No. 4407 (1926), and then extended
indefinitely by the Indian Reorganization Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1976). All
restraints ended on September 5, 1965. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 971, 974(b) (1976)
(termination of federal supervision over the Ponca Tribe of Native Americans
of Nebraska).
95. REPORT OF TnE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, HR. ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 51st Cong.
2d Sess. 146 app. (1890).
96. Id.
97. Id. Rev. John E. Smith, missionary at the agency, stated that the Poncas
"took kindly to this measure [the allotment law] and manifested great inter-
est, and for the most part exercised sound judgment, in selecting their lands."
Id. at 147 app. He was not as kind when writing about Standing Bear.
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Only Ponca Indians selected allotments upon the Ponca land
which had been mistakenly placed in the Great Sioux Reservation
by the Laramie Treaty. On October 23, 1890, President Harrison
proclaimed that the Indian title to the unallotted lands in that area
was extinguished.98
While this treatment of the Ponca as reflected in these laws and
the Standing Bear case obviously vitally affected the small Ponca
tribe and its members, it was destined to be a catalyst for far-
reaching changes in federal Indian policy affecting thousands of
Native Americans everywhere. It is this result, rather than the ac-
tual holding, which makes Standing Bear v. Crook historically sig-
nificant. This statement, and the following discussion, is not
intended to tarnish the lustre of the holding itself. Without the ef-
forts of Tibbles, Webster, Poppleton, the members of the Omaha
Ponca Committee, and the courageous decision by Judge Dundy,
Standing Bear and his small band would have been forcefully re-
turned to the Indian Territory. History would have been denied
one bright page exhibiting man's humanity to fellow men, and one
of the few praiseworthy episodes in nineteenth century White-In-
dian relations as well as an example of the superiority of law over
force as a solution to human problems. But, as Standing Bear aid
This wily and crafty chief, seeing the emoluments of his office slip-
ping away from him because of the growing intelligence of the Pon-
cas, too lazy to work, but not too proud to beg, hatched in his idle
brain the scheme of selling this land and of removing his immediate
followers to Indian Territory, leaving the rest to starve for aught he
cared, to spend his remaining days in the pleasures of the dance and
harem. He has been and returned, a sadder and seemingly a wiser
man. The most unfortunate thing in the whole movement is that he,
the prime mover and instigator of the whole scheme, a man who has
brought repeated disaster upon his people, had his home and land
reserved for him, while many of his followers, who but for his perni-
cious conduct would have steadily gone forward towards civilization,
have lost the homes and land which they prized far more than he did
his.
Id.
98. 1 C. KAPPLER, supra note 10, at 946. The old agency and school grounds (S 1/
2, SE 1/4, Sec. 26 and the S 1/2, SW 1/4, Sec. 25, all in T. 32 N., R. 7 W. of the
6th P.AM.) were reserved from entry or settlement.
The Ponca Indians (the Ponca Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma joined by the
Ponca Tribe of Native Americans of Nebraska) sued the United States for
damages under the Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70r-1
(1976), for taking the old Ponca Reservation on the Niobrara. The Commis-
sion, and later the Court of Claims, reviewed the facts of this historical event,
and the latter body concluded that the United States was entitled to a credit
against any damages the Ponca might later recover for the $48,389.46 paid to
the Cherokees for the new Ponca Reservation in Indian Territory, but was
not entitled to a credit for the acres allotted to Standing Bear's band on the
old reservation. See 17 Indian CL Comm. 162 (1966), affid in par4 rev'd in
part, Ponca Tribe v. United States, 183 Ct. CL 673 (1968).
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his followers discovered, freedom to move off the reservation and
to sever the tribal relationship, did not provide a place to live, food
to eat, or clothing to wear. No opinion by a federal judge could
supply those things. However, before the nineteenth century
closed a new federal Indian policy, which supporters thought
would supply those necessities, was in operation-enacted in large
part because of the case of Standing Bear v. Crook and the work
by the men and women involved in it.
Tibbles may not have envisioned a broad attack upon federal
Indian policy when he first interviewed Standing Bear and his fel-
low prisoners at Fort Omaha. However, shortly after Judge
Dundy's decision, Tibbles, and others he persuaded to assist, at-
tacked on a broader front. Tibbles, viewing the plight of all Indians
in the same light as he had previously viewed the issue of slavery
of the black race, resigned his newpaper position at the Omaha
Daily Herald and commenced a fight to "free every Indian in the
country from ever again dreading that the whims of anyone in
Washington could willfully control his person or his belongings
and could hinder his liberty to live his life reasonably."99
99. T. TreBLES, supra note 27, at 204. Tibbles' crusade over the next few years
was motivated by several events as well as by his personal views. First, Sec-
retary Schurz did not respond to the appeal for aid sent by the Omaha minis-
ters. Second, a letter from Commissioner Hayt to the Secretary (April 10,
1879) charged that Standing Bear was "constantly grumbling" and "full of dis-
content ... while the other Poncas were at work." Tibbles considered this an
unfair attack. In addition the letter charged that efforts to attract public at-
tention to the Ponca cause were made by "grossly misrepresenting the cir-
cumstances of the case," id. at 47-48, in effect charging Tibbles with
falsehoods because he had sent the dispatches to the newspapers. Third,
Tibbles believed the report of distressing conditions in the Indian Territory
which Bright Eyes and her father reported after their inspection trip. Fourth,
he was urged on by others, including, according to Tibbles, General Crook.
Id. at 204. And finally, his dispatches to eastern newspapers provoked very
sympathetic responses. T. TIBBLES, supra note 45, at 33.
Tibbles and his fellow reformers were aided by public opinion on the out-
rageous treatment accorded two other bands of Indians about this time: the
Northern Cheyenne and the Nez Perce. After surrendering at Fort Robinson
in the spring of 1877, the Northern Cheyenne were sent to Indian Territory in
the fall, where for a year they suffered from inadequate housing, disease, and
insufficient food. A large number of them left Indian Territory without per-
mission on September 9, 1878. They were finally discovered by the military
and lodged at Fort Robinson. On January 3, 1879, Washingon ordered that
they be returned to the Indian Territory. They refused and soon broke for
freedom from the barracks where they were confined. The military pursued
the fleeing Indians and killed many. See M. SANDOZ, CHEYENNE AuTUmN
(1953); D. BROWN, supra note 39, at 315-31. Coincidentally, at about the time
the Northern Cheyenne were breaking out of Fort Robinson's barracks,
Standing Bear's band was stealing away from the Indian Territory.
In January 1877, the government ordered the Nez Perce to vacate the Wal-
lowa Valley in eastern Oregon and move to a reservation in northern Idaho
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In late June 1879 Tibbles went east to spread the facts about the
Ponca case, to discuss the treatment of other Indians, and to raise
funds for the fight to reform federal Indian policy. He was received
well in Chicago and warmly in Boston. In Boston he met and im-
pressed the great reformer, Wendell Phillips, who encouraged Tib-
bles to continue his efforts, but warned he would be the target of
personal criticism. 00
Soon after Tibbles' return to Omaha (September 6, 1879), the
Omaha Ponca Committee invited Bright Eyes and Standing Bear
to speak before a local church group. Although Bright Eyes was
overcome with emotion and could not conclude, her words and de-
meanor electrified the audience.O' This set the stage for a second,
and larger, eastern speaking tour using Tibbles, Standing Bear,
Bright Eyes, and her brother, Woodworker (Frank La Flesche).
Bright Eyes was motivated to join because her tribe, the Omahas,
feared removal to the Indian Territory.
On the afternoon of October 29, 1879, just prior to a public recep-
tion to be held in Boston, Tibbles and Standing Bear received two
sad messages-Tibbles' wife had died in Omaha and Big Snake,
Standing Bear's brother, had been shot and killed in the Ponca
(Lapwai). Reluctantly they started to move-after being threatened with
force and after one chief (Tulhulhulsut) was arrested and confined in the
guardhouse. During the move some young warriors murdered several
whites, and the 1877 "Nez Perce War" followed. The Nez Perce, pursued by
military forces all the way, fled some 1800 miles eastward across Idaho and
Montana, through Yellowstone National Park, and back into Montana before
surrendering (October 5, 1877) in the Bear Paw mountains in north central
Montana. The last sentence of the surrender speech of their chief (Joseph) is
as memorable as the one Chief Standing Bear delivered after his habeas
corpus victory: "I will fight no more forever."
Despite the fact that General Howard and Colonel Miles promised Chief
Joseph at the time of surrender that the Nez Perce would be returned to
Lapwai, the captives were first imprisoned at Fort Leavenworth (November
1877 to July 1878), and then later settled on land in the Indian Territory.
Later, see note 85 supra, the Nez Perce were returned to the northwest. See
H. HowARD, supra note 85, passim; D. BROWN, supra note 39, at 299-314. One
author concluded that settlement of the Ponca matter paved the way for the
return of the Nez Perce. See R. MADooCK, THE REFORMERS AND T AMERI-
CAN INDIAN 189 (1971).
100. In Chicago when Tibbles mentioned the names of Secretary Schurz and
Commissioner Hayt, a voice from the audience yelled, "Hang them." See
Clark, supra note 83, at 500. From that time on emotions ran high on both
sides. See note 101 infra.
101. Tibbles reported that men in the audience "swore-there in church with the
bishop on the platform," and one in the audience yelled: "If I were Standing
Bear, I would let the courts go hang. I'd take my tomahawk and scalping
knife and follow the trail of the Secretary of the Interior. Then I'd settle the
thing right therel" T. TIBBLES, supra note 27, at 212.
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agency office in Indian Territory. 02 Tibbles, grief stricken, was
ready to give up and go home, but Standing Bear consoled him and
urged him on, reminding him that many Indians grieved over the
deaths of their loved ones: "You suffer greatly but they suffer
more. Promise me that you will not forsake them."103 Tibbles and
Standing Bear continued the tour. Many receptions and meetings
in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, and other places
were held in the fall of 1879 and the early months of 1880 before the
party returned to Omaha. Famous literary figures joined the re-
form movement. The most important person of letters influenced
by the speakers was Helen Hunt Jackson. Her interest in the fed-
102. The killing of Big Snake is a lengthy story:
On May 13, 1879, Big Snake and 65 other Poncas left their agency to visit
the Cheyennes, even though permission for such visits had been refused by
their agent, William I. Whiteman. At Whiteman's request the army arrested
the group and confined Big Snake (and two others) in the military guard-
house. Big Snake's defiance might have been prompted by his brother's
habeas corpus case. Agent Whiteman recommended confinement "until the
tribe has recovered from the demoralizing effects of the decision recently
made by the United States District Court in Nebraska, in the case of Standing
Bear." Letter from Whiteman to Commissioner Hayt, May 21, 1879, in LETTER
FRoM TE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, S. Doc. No. 14, 46th Cong., 3d Sess. 4
(1881). General Sherman made clear the effect he would give to Judge
Dundy's decision when he authorized the arrest of the Poncas. He stated in a
May 22, 1879, letter to General Sheridan at Chicago: "'he release under writ
of habeas corpus of the Poncas in Nebraska does not apply to any other than
that specific case." Id. at 5.
Big Snake was released after several months imprisonment and returned
to his Indian Territory reservation about August 4, 1879. On October 20, 1879,
Whiteman wrote Hayt that he feared Big Snake might assault him and rec-
ommended that Big Snake be arrested, conveyed to Fort Reno, "and there
confine [d] for the remainder of his natural life." Id. at 6. On October 25, Gen-
eral Sherman ordered General Sheridan to cause Big Snake to be arrested
and "held in custody till released by superior authority." Id. at 7. On October
31, 1879, a military detail attempting to arrest Big Snake in Agent Whiteman's
office found him strongly opposed and a very powerful man. Although un-
armed, Big Snake resisted mightily and could not be felled by rifle-butt blows
to his head. In the course of the struggle, a corporal killed Big Snake with
one rifle shot to the head.
Characterization of the homicide varied greatly. A subsequent Army in-
vestigation placed emphasis upon the bad 'reputation" of the victim, his
resistance to arrest, and the smallness of the arresting force and hinted that
Big Snake's actions before the shooting reasonably supported a belief he had
a knife. Id. at 11-15. On the other hand, others called the shooting a "cow-
ardly, willful murder." See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 259 (testimony
of Inspector Pollock). When the Crook Commission visited the Indian Terri-
tory Poncas in January 1881, White Eagle pleaded for indemnity for the kill-
ing, but General Crook said it was beyond the power of the Commission. See
PONCA COMMISSION supra note 35, at 27. Senator Dawes' hostile attitude to-
ward Secretary Schurz developed in part because nothing was ever done
about Big Snake's killing. See 112 CONG. REC. 1056-59 (1881).
103. T. TBBLES, supra note 27, at 214.
[Vol. 60:451
STANDING BEAR
eral treatment of Indians was whetted by listening to the speakers
from Nebraska; it is possible they were entirely responsible for her
interest. Her January 1881 book, A Century of Dishonor, related
the history of some of the harsher federal treatment of Indians,
including a full account of the Ponca case.O4
Far more important than the Nebraska speakers' successes in
interesting literary personages in the battle to reform federal In-
dian policy was their ability to gain the ear of persons with political
power. The former could write articles and books, but only the lat-
ter could draft laws. Two important events which eventually led to
federal reform were: first, the formation of a Boston committee
containing important political figures; second, the increasing inter-
est of United States Senator Dawes of Massachusetts in federal
Indian policy.X05
Although from 1882 to 1887 Tibbles and Bright Eyes made other
speaking trips eastward (and even to England), their connection
with the reform movement (and Standing Bear's association also)
essentially ended when they returned exhausted to Omaha in
April of 1880. Shortly after their return, Congress settled the
Ponca issue by accepting the Crook Commission suggestion that
the separate groups be allowed to choose where to stay. The
Omahas' fear of removal ceased in 1882 when Congress authorized
their allotments in severalty; 0 6 thus, the danger which had ini-
104. Tibbles stated, "I strongly doubt if we could ever have won without her help."
Id. at 216. He also claimed he turned over much material to Helen Jackson,
which she used in writing CENTuRY OF DIsHoNOR. Others do not agree with
Tibbles' assessment of the importance of Jackson's support. See I.
MARDOC, supra note 99, at 185-86.
105. The Boston committee grew out of a meeting of Boston merchants held on
November 25, 1879. The Governor of Massachusetts and Mayor of Boston
were on the five-person committee. It is clear that the committee had heard
Tibbles, Bright Eyes, and Standing Bear. The committee examined minutely
the Ponca case and engaged in a written debate with Schurz about it. See
Committee on the Removal of the Ponca Indians, WxsTRNx A~mzcANA:
FRONTIER HISTORY OF THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI WEST 1500-1900, Reel No. 63, No.
612 (Microfilm, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Committee on the Removal of the
Ponca Indians].
Without doubt Senator Dawes' interest in Indian affairs was first kindled
by the events in Boston, refueled by testimony about the Ponca case (includ-
ing that of Tibbles, Standing Bear, and Bright Eyes) he heard as a member of
an 1880 Senate Select Committe, and finally fanned into anger and indigna-
tion by his later concern over the shooting of Big Snake and his feud with
Secretary Schurz.
106. See Act of Aug. 7, 1882, ch. 434, § 2, 22 Stat. 341 (1882). Tibbles and Bright
Eyes met ethnologist Alice C. Fletcher in Boston in 1879. In the fall of 1881
they conducted her on a tour of the Omaha, Ponca, and some Sioux settle-
ments. Standing Bear hosted them when they visited his band on the Nio-
brara. This was Alice Fletcher's first opportunity to observe American Indian
culture in the field. She assisted in obtaining passage of the Omaha allot-
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tially motivated Bright Eyes to join the tour had been removed.
Some of the tour's techniques had not been pleasing to Standing
Bear and Bright Eyes. For example, Standing Bear appeared
before eastern audiences in his native garb: long hair, blanket,
feathers, toothed necklace, and moccasins. Although this attracted
audiences and added force to his words (which Bright Eyes trans-
lated), it was not entirely to Standing Bear's liking. In truth it was
contrary to the theory of Judge Dundy's opinion that Standing
Bear had broken away from Indian customs and tribal life.10
There is evidence that the effectiveness of the tour waned. Not
everyone believed all the facts which the speakers presented, and
futhermore, the focal point of the reform was now in Congress, not
in public meeting halls.O8 The campaign for reform had become
ment law, and she later spent many years studying the Omaha culture. She,
together with Francis La Flesche (Bright Eyes' brother), authored a book on
the ethnology of the Omahas in 1911. See T. TIBBLES, supra note 27, at 236-94;
R. MAPwocy, supra note 99, at 220; 2 A. FLETCHER & F. LA FLESCHE, supra note
3, at 635-42.
107. One authority reported that Standing Bear rebelled in New York and was
about to shorten his long hair and doff his Indian attire when Helen Hunt
Jackson induced Bright Eyes to persuade him to wait until the tour was com-
pleted. Clark, supra note 83, at 507. The same author reported that Bright
Eyes wore Indian clothing too, but Tibbles stated both she and her brother
dressed in "civilized style." See T. TIBBLES, supra note 27, at 213. Bright Eyes
undoubtedly was somewhat ill at ease since she was well-educated and must
have been confused by the role she was required to assume. She was uncom-
fortable in being introduced in England as an "Indian Princess." Id. at 298.
She would not have approved of the name "Bright Eyes" used here. Id. at
217.
The bust of Standing Bear in the Nebraska Capitol Building thoroughly
depicts him as an Indian. In this author's estimation, the bust does little to
convey the peaceful nature of the subject and is not completely faithful to the
case of Standing Bear v. Crook, which emphasized the severing of Indian
ties.
If Judge Dundy's opinion had later become the basis for many similar
suits, lawyers and judges would have had great difficulty applying his theory
that Indians were free from government control if they severed tribal ties.
Consider evidence produced by Webster and Poppleton at the trial in Omaha:
the dress, language, work habits, and religious beliefs and practices of the
petitioning Poncas. T. TiBLES, supra note 44, at 66-90. The difficulty may
also be tested by asking how the Northern Cheyenne, imprisoned at Fort
Robinson waiting to be returned to the Indian Territory, or Chief Joseph and
his Nez Perce, imprisoned at Fort Leavenworth waiting transfer to a reserva-
tion, or even Big Snake, confined in the guardhouse at Fort Reno waiting to
return to his Ponca Reservation, would have fared in a federal habeas corpus
case. Bright Eyes worried while on the speaking trips that even she could be
returned to the Omaha Reservation in Nebraska. See T. TriBLES, supra note
27, at 219.
108. One authority stated that Helen Hunt Jackson doubted the veracity of Tib-
bles and Bright Eyes, and that Dawes thought the Nebraskans would serve
the Ponca cause better by going home. L. PRIEST, UNCLE SAm's STEPcHIL-
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increasingly bitter and personal. Wendell Phillips' prediction that
Tibbles would be personally attacked came true.10 9 Thus, while
the Nebraska speakers had focused the nation's attention upon se-
rious matters, others would carry on to the finish.
The 'Tinish" occurred on February 8, 1887, when President
Cleveland signed the General Allotment Law, commonly referred
to as the "Dawes Act." The central feature of the Act was the allot-
ment of land in severalty to individual Indians. Until this Act was
passed, most lands reserved for Indians were owned "com-
munally" or "jointly." Under the Dawes Act individual Indians
owned described land. Tibbles was in favor of the allotment policy
because it would prevent the evil he perceived to be the most vi-
cious: relocating Indians at the "whim" of persons in power in
Washington. Tibbles claimed that the Boston committee asked
him to draft an allotment law and that he gave his draft to commit-
tee member James B. Thayer, professor of constitutional law at
Harvard. He claimed that Thayer made a few changes, sent it to
Washington, where more changes occurred, but that essentially
the Dawes Act followed his original draft. 1 0
DREN 78 (1942). One of the reports of the Boston committee stated that al-
though it believed Standing Bear and Bright Eyes, it would rely upon facts in
official government reports. Committee on the Removal of the Ponca Indians,
supra note 105.
109. Tibbles was accused of using the speaking tour as a means of livelihood and
as a source of funds to provide necessities for Standing Bear's band. Tibbles'
defense was that he did not retain control over any of the money raised. See
T. TmsIs, supra note 27, at 206, 217. The strong feeling of opposition is ap-
parent in the following letter sent to Schurz by a friend when Tibbles married
Bright Eyes:
[T]his... act of the pale-face is in the line of the other wrongs per-
petrated upon this most unfortunate band of Indians, and... [I
fear] that the confiding Indian maiden may some day feel that the
fate of Big Snake was preferable to the unhappy one which she has
chosen.
Will Dawes hold the Department responsible for this? Will Gov-
ernor Long [Massachusetts] add it to his long list of indictments?
Let us hope that both may take a rose-colored view of the union be-
tween the dusky daughter of the forest and the gay professional phi-
lanthropist who buried all the wrongs of her race in a greater one
upon herself. I fear poor Bright Eyes has made a mistake, but I am
willing to forgive her if the act effectively disposes of Tibbles. Even
so great a sacrifice may be rare economy if it gives the Nation a rest
from the vexatious borings of the Tibbles school of philanthropy.
4 F. BANCROFT, SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL
ScHUZ 147-48 (1913) (letter of A. Bell).
Despite such gloomy forecasts, the couple lived happily until Bright Eyes'
death on May 26, 1903. Her epitaph states: "She did all that she could to
make the world happier and better."
110. T. TrIBLES, supra note 27, at 295.
This article has isolated for discussion the relationship of Ponca history,
part of which was the case of Standing Bear v. Crook, and the efforts of the
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Every historical episode, no matter how trivial in isolation, is
Chief, Tibbles, and Bright Eyes to encourage passage of the Dawes Act. This
is not the complete story of the Dawes Act's passage, of course. The full story
has been well related and documented in two excellent works. See L. PRIEST,
supra note 108; &. MARnoci, supra note 104. The general excellence of
Mardock's book remains despite the fact that he erroneously gives Wendell
Phillips, and not Tibbles, credit for writing THE PONCA CHIEFS. See R.
MARnocK, supra note 104, at 179, 240. Bright Eyes wrote an introduction,
Wendell Philips, a dedication, and the book was originally published in 1880
under a pseudonym (Zylyff), but Tibbles was its author.
No attempt is made in this article to discuss the subsequent history of the
allotment policy. Suffice to say that although it may have served to prevent
Washington policy makers from moving tribes here and there at "whim," it
did not provide answers to all Indian problems. There is evidence that wiser
heads in the late 1880s warned that the Dawes Act would not solve them all.
See, e.g., L. PRiEST, supra note 108, at 248-52. Professor Thayer warned that
much remained to be done. See Thayer, The Dawes Bill and the Indians, 61
ATLANTic MONTHLY 315 (1888). By 1911, Alice Fletcher, whose efforts were
instrumental in obtaining an allotment law for the Omaha Tribe, was troub-
led. See 2 A. FLETCHER & F. LA FLESCHE, supra note 3, at 636-42. Tibbles cou-
pled his plea for allotments with bringing "the Indians as persons under the
protection of the courts." T. TeBLES, supra note 27, at 208-09. Obviously Tib-
bles borrowed this idea from the case of Standing Bear v. Crook, but it was
only another way to prevent Washington from moving Indian tribes at will.
This article does not detail the history of United States citizenship for In-
dians. Indian citizenship was much discussed during this same period, and
even today some think Judge Dundy's decision made Standing Bear and his
followers citizens. It did not, as the Omaha Ponca Committee knew so well.
By another case, originating in Omaha and brought by the same lawyers who
represented Standing Bear's band in the habeas corpus case, the committee
sought to establish that Indians were citizens of the United States, but the
United States Surpeme Court ruled they were not citizens by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). Lambertson op-
posed Poppleton and Webster in the Supreme Court, and this time won. Af-
ter his victory he wrote about the subject in a national law review. See
Lambertson, Indian Citizenship, 20 Am. L REv. 183 (1886).
Even after Judge Dundy's holding in the habeas corpus case, lawyers con-
tinued to debate whether an Indian was a "person." For example, in 1881 the
author of a legal article stated. "An Indian is not a person within the meaning
of the Constitution." Canfield, The Legal Position of the Indian, 15 Am. L.
REv. 21, 28 (1881) (emphasis added).
Whether an Indian was a "person" was understood differently by lawyers
and laymen, including such Indians as Standing Bear. Laymen thought the
question asked whether an Indian possessed human characteristics uncon-
nected with his or her legal position. Thus Standing Bear argued that the
same blood would flow from his arm as would flow from Dundy's arm. Others
stated that if an Indian was "tickled" he would laugh the same as anyone
else. Lawyers, on the other hand, did not deny these common consequences,
but instead asked whether Indians, ticklish or not, were included within the
protection of the laws and Constitution of the United States. Chief Justice
Marshall's famous Cherokee decisions, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), left Indians in a unique
legal position (not independent, but domestic, dependent nations) and thus
neither completely "in," nor yet completely "out" of United States law. At
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part of a larger picture and may typify it. The Ponca history was
closely tied to the enactment of a new and important federal In-
dian policy, the allotment law. Yet there are other, less obvious
conclusions which may be extracted from the Ponca case to illus-
trate some general characteristics of federal Indian law in the
nineteenth century.
Until 1871 many details of United States-Indian relationships
were contained in treaties. 1 Difficulties in handling these details
by the treaty process troubled courts and legislatures for decades
after treaties were ratified. Many of these difficulties appeared in
the Ponca history. One of the most common was the language
barrier.
The fact that the two sides spoke different languages required
the use of interpreters, who were often incompetent and at times
dishonest. Indian Inspector Kemble told a Senate committee that
few interpreters were "safe"; Reverend Samuel Hinman, a Santee
Agency missionary who frequently served as an interpreter, in-
formed the same committee that only one out of a hundred inter-
preters was good enough to prevent misunderstandings." 2 At this
the time of the Ponca crisis, legal minds often solved the perplexing legal
status of Indians by placing them 'i" if they had severed tribal relations and
followed "civilized" habits, but fenced them "out" if they maintained the old
tribal life style. Judge Dundy did exactly this.
Today the theory of Standing Bear's case should be an anathema to those
persons, Indian and non-Indian, who seek to strengthen tribal power. See,
e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975, 25
U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n (1976); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(Supp. I 1979). The most critical statement which may be made about
Judge Dundy's opinion is that it made Indians "persons," and thus free from
the "whims" of Washington bureaucrats, only if they abandoned their tribe
as an instrument for social, economic, and political advancement.
Judge Dundy's separation of Indians into two classes--those who main-
tain tribal status and those who do not-is not entirely absent from current
Indian law. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (sustaining a fed-
eral preference for "tribal" Indians in the Indian service); United States v.
Washington, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981) (Indians not entitled to treaty fish-
ing rights unless they maintain an organized tribal structure); see also F. CO-
HEN, supra note 9, at 5, 573.
111. Using treaties as Indian policy-making devices was an inherited method.
Before 1776 most European powers made treaties with the tribes. See F. Co-
HEN, supra note 9, at 47. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation granted
Congress "power of... managing all affairs with the Indians not members of
any of the states; provided that the legislative right of any State within its
own limits be not infringed or violated." M. JENSEN, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERA-
TION 263, 268 (1970). Indian treaty making continued between 1776 and the
ratification of the United States Constitution. These treaties appear in chron-
ological order in 2 C. KAPPLER, supra note 10. After ratification, many treaties
were made until the practice ceased in 1871.
112. SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 96 (testimony of E.C. Kemble), 336 (testi-
mony of S.D. Hinman).
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same Senate hearing Standing Bear was astounded to learn that in
1875 he had agreed to remove to the Indian Territory; he repudi-
ated the paper which so stated, even though it bore his signa-
ture.n3 Agent Carrier, who procured the agreement, was probably
equally shocked to hear Standing Bear state he did not agree to
the move. Bright Eyes explained that the Ponca language con-
tained no word or expression to differentiate the Indian Territory
(the area south of Kansas) from other land occupied by Indians,
such as the Omaha Reservation." 4 Thus Standing Bear might rea-
sonably have thought the destination under discussion was some-
where other than that Carrier had in mind.
Anyone reading the English version of Section 2 of the 1858
Ponca treaty would clearly understand that it permitted the Presi-
dent to determine from time to time whether annuity payments
(totalling $285,000 over a thirty year period) might be made either
in cash or in commodities. Apparently the Poncas understood the
payments were to be cash only." 5 The historical record contains
no explanation of this misunderstanding.
The language barrier affected communications less formal than
treaty drafts, but just as important to the deft handling of issues.
Thus Kemble may have used English words which clearly in-
formed any listener competent in that language that the Ponca
must agree to surrender their Niobrara Reservation before he
would conduct their leaders on a search for a new homeland, but
the interpreter's words might not have conveyed that idea to the
Poncas. Many of the Poncas testified that they did not understand
that Kemble's words conditioned the search upon final abandon-
ment of the old lands.
These instances of the language barrier interferring with the
smooth handling of dealings with the Poncas demonstrate that lan-
guage was an omnipresent hurdle and not an irritant confined to
treaty-making. At the same time, one must recognize that a misun-
derstanding in a treaty harmed much more than the smooth flow of
relationships because the Indians viewed a treaty as a bilateral
agreement of the most solemn and sacred nature. Thus when a
113. Id. at 146 (testimony of A.J. Carrier), 156-57 (testimony of Susette La Flesche
for Standing Bear).
114. Id. at 160 (testimony of Susette La Flesche).
115. Id. at 264 (testimony of A.J. Pollock). Indian Inspector Pollock testified that
"conditions" attached to promises or "alternative promises" were not readily
understood by Indians. Id.
Indians were not accustomed to making decisions which would not take
effect until a time far into the future. They compressed the time between
making a decision and implementing it much more than did non-Indians.
Thus they found little need for conditional promises or alternatives and paid
scant attention to such devices when they were used by others.
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tribe's treaty expectations were intertwined with a language prob-
lem, a failure to communicate was very damaging.
Courts have developed some rules for alleviating much of the
harm flowing from misunderstandings. Thus "black letter" law in-
forms us that ambiguous expressions are to be resolved in favor of
the Indian parties concerned, treaties are to be construed as Indi-
ans themselves would understand them, and Indian treaties must
be construed liberally in favor of the Indians." 6
A second major impediment to harmonious white-Indian rela-
tionships was the failure of each side to understand fully the gov-
ernmental processes of the other. Indians often thought a treaty
was effective the moment it was signed. They acted in ignorance of
the Senate's role in treaty-making, or thought Senatorial consent
was a formality certain to occur. For example, as soon as the Pon-
cas signed the 1858 treaty, they abandoned the lands they agreed
to vacate and moved to the small area reserved for them as a reser-
vation. However, the Senate acted more slowly and none of the
United States' promises, including promised annuities, could be
implemented until the Senate acted. The lengthy delay worried
the Poncas, not only because the tardy annuities were sorely
needed, but also because the long delay raised doubts about the
integrity and good faith of the United States.
As another example, when General Crook's Commission visited
the Southern Poncas to question them about their desire to remain
there, the principal Chief, White Eagle, could not understand why
the issue was not settled. The Chief explained that the question
had been fully discussed by the tribe for a month or more and
thereafter the tribal leaders had traveled to Washington and
signed a paper to settle the matter on the terms the tribe had de-
cided. Today, anyone reading the Chief's words senses his feeling
of disgust that the Commission was investigating a matter he con-
sidered closed. The Chief, however, failed to realize that the issue
of what to do with Standing Bear's contingent in the north had not
been discussed or settled. Nor did Chief White Eagle realize that
the President needed to proceed cautiously because the entire
Ponca matter was a political hotbed of agitation on the national
scene and Standing Bear's group had great support, even in the
Senate.
At several points in the Ponca story, it is evident that whites did
not understand the tribal method of decision-making. The Crook
116. See State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759, 497 P.2d 1386 (1972), where the court con-
strued the English treaty words "right to hunt" to include the right to fish
because the Indian language did not distinguish hunting from fishing, but
employed a general term (in English meaning "to obtain wild food") to refer
to both hunting and fishing.
1981]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Commission heard Chief White Eagle and Chief Standing Bear re-
port the wishes of their respective followings concerning a perma-
nent location, yet proceeded to interrogate every individual Indian
who attended any meeting about whether he, or she, was of the
same mind as the chief. Although both chiefs told the Commission
all were of the same mind, the Commission seemed bent upon
checking the accuracy of each chiefs statements. One wonders
how the chiefs viewed this process of checking the truth of their
reports of tribal unanimity. If Indians are faulted for failing to un-
derstand that the Senate's consent was needed to vitalize a treaty,
whites are equally blameworthy for failing to realize that a chief
spoke for his people and that additional consent from them was
not needed.
Many histories of white-Indian relationships contain accounts
of trips by Indian leaders to Washington, which often included di-
rect contact with the President. Often these accounts, expressly or
subtly, convey the impression that the trips were a stratagem to
impress the Indian visitors with the power of the United States
and the superiority of its culture and institutions. This picture is
not entirely false, but it omits an important facet of Indian culture:
Indian leaders did not approve of negotiating with subordinates in
the federal bureaucracy. To ask Indian leaders to confer with sub-
ordinates was undignified and a "put down," in the current vernac-
ular. This attitude attached to negotiations with other tribes as
well as with the federal government.
The Ponca history is dotted with instances of negotiations at
both high and low levels of the federal hierarchy. For example
when the Poncas were unhappy with their new home on the Qua-
paw Reservation, they obtained the President's permission to
move to other land and seemed pleased with this mode of proceed-
ing. Although their agent, for an unexplained reason, attempted to
delay their relocation, they moved anyway, no doubt made bold by
their direct dealings with the President. The Crook Commission
obtained status through its direct appointment by the President.
The Commission was careful to point out, however, that the Presi-
dent would not make the final decision but would submit a recom-
mendation to Congress for approval. This reminder was necessary
because Indians were not accustomed to dealing with an entity
where decision-making was ruled by a political philosophy of
power separation.
The Ponca history reveals instances where the President might
have aided greatly had he shown more interest in the problem.
One wonders if Kemble and his Washington superiors in the In-
dian Office did not err at several points by failing to take a delega-
tion of Ponca leaders to meet with the President. For example,
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when the eight chiefs became discouraged on their inspection trip,
and again when the bulk of the tribe refused to pack up and cross
the Niobrara, a visit with the President might have altered history.
The failure of the President to answer the telegram sent from
Sloan, Iowa, by the Ponca chiefs who left the inspection trip was
not only bad manners, but also a failure to act when action might
have prevented the later need for force to accomplish removal.
Reverend Riggs, a Santee missionary, told a Senate committee
that had the President ordered the Poncas to go to the Indian Ter-
ritory, they would have obeyed, even if the bulk of them personally
did not want to go."17 Chief White Eagle's testimony before the
same committee was in accord with Riggs' assessment." 8
The handling of the Ponca case was often characterized by bad
or unwise decisions stemming from ignorance or arrogance. Secre-
tary Schurz admitted he was not very experienced in Indian affairs
when he became Secretary of the Interior. After the Ponca re-
moval was accomplished, he admitted it was a mistake and stated
had he the power to do it over, he would not let it occur. One won-
ders why no one in Washington suggested negotiating with the
Sioux to reacquire the small Ponca Niobrara Reservation. 119 The
failure of the United States to provide adequate food and shelter
for the Poncas after removal approached criminal neglect; previous
removal experiences with other tribes, such as the Pawnees, had
forewarned that health problems might occur. Additionally, Kem-
ble explicitly warned Washington what would happen if shelter,
food, and medical aid were not provided.
Federal Indian policy in the nineteenth century was not sharply
defined, nor fairly administered. The Ponca removal was sup-
ported as implementation of a general policy to relocate all Indian
tribes in one section of the country, when, in fact, that policy was
neither clearly articulated nor universally followed. Although the
Sioux were nearly removed,120 they were not, partly because they
were such a large tribe. Several persons close to the Ponca case
observed that small, weak, and peaceful tribes received worse
treatment than larger, more powerful, and certainly more hostile
tribes. While the Poncas were starving, wagon loads of supplies
for the far more hostile Sioux were delivered. The Poncas ob-
117. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 174 (testimony of Alfred S. Riggs).
118. Id. at 194 (testimony of White Eagle).
119. The United States found ways to negotiate with the Sioux to diminish the
size of the Great Sioux Reservation, which was demanded by whites, but
seemed unable to do the same to aid the Poncas. No great difficulty would
have been encountered had the Ponca land mix-ups been part of the negotia-
tions concerned with larger land cessions. I have not discovered any evi-
dence that anyone ever suggested this possibility.
120. See G. HYDE, supra note 14, at 259.
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served this, as did many whites interested in justice for the
Poncas.
Federal policy was often haphazard. The most glaring example
was the inclusion of the Ponca lands in the great Sioux Reserva-
tion. Another example occurred when the Poncas were relocated
on the Quapaw Reservation in that no legal foundation for their
presence (temporary or permanent) had been arranged; the same
was true for many months after they had moved to a new area in
the Indian Territory. Whether they were owners, tenants, posses-
sors, or trespassers had not been considered, nor had the bounda-
ries of their land been settled. This uncertainty disturbed them
greatly. Federal policy dictated that they should give up the hunt
and become farmers. The Poncas agreed with that role. However,
successful farming required tillers of the soil to make permanent
improvements and to be assured of a durable relationship with the
land. This permanency was sadly lacking during much of the
Ponca history. The need for some definite and unchangeable rela-
tionship to the land caused many tribes, including the Ponca and
the Omaha, to see great value in the allotment principle.
Federal Indian policy lacked orderliness-too often the timing
of one action was pressured by the timing of another. This is
demonstrated best by the relationship between the Ponca removal
and the selection of Missouri River points for Sioux ration distribu-
tions. The Sioux made clear they did not want to go to these points
for ration distribution and remained there for just one season.
Even then, the Brule Sioux, whom federal officials worried would
come in hostile contact with the Ponca, defiantly remained some
distance from the Missouri for most of the distribution period.
Kemble was pressured by the rapidly approaching date of the
Sioux arrival. This time squeeze left him insufficient time to nego-
tiate, so he resorted to force to remove the Poncas. The pace of
these events certainly was much faster than Indians employed
when important decisions were at hand. At least one knowledgea-
ble observer thought the Poncas' slowness in preparing to move
south indicated a desire for a tribal meeting to discuss the issues,
and that after a council they would have moved, but the hard-
pressed and exasperated Kemble saw it as complete and final defi-
ance. Which person's judgment was correct cannot now be settled,
but, as a general proposition, the deliberateness with which deci-
sions were made in Indian circles in the nineteenth century always
annoyed whites, who were impatient with slowness when there
was a large wilderness to subdue.
The Ponca history and Standing Bear's case were indeed a mi-
crocosm of federal Indian policy in the nineteenth century. In this
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swirl of events Standing Bear is the central and commanding actor.
Of course he was aided by a good supporting cast:
-Tibbles with his enthusiasm for the cause of human rights,
his skills in using the press as an instrument to marshall public
opinion, and his simple but moving speeches to eastern audiences;
-the unselfish and untiring efforts of two willing and able lead-
ers of the Nebraska bar, Webster and Poppleton;
-the devotion of Bright Eyes;
-the courage of Judge Elmer Dundy;
-the research and writing of Helen Hunt Jackson (even if Cen-
tury of Dishonor is "propaganda");
-the charity of Bishop Clarkson and the Omaha Ponca
Committee;
-the support of the Boston literary figures and politicians who
flocked to the noble cause of righting a wrong done to a few per-
sons who were helpless to help themselves.
The drama would not have unfolded as it did without their serv-
ices. Yet they would have had no part in an intense, human drama
if Standing Bear had not taken the road northward from Indian
Territory on a journey which eventually led to the judicial declara-
tion that he was a person and was entitled to a measure of protec-
tion from the courts. Standing Bear's nobility, eloquence, courage,
devotion to the welfare of his band, and, above all, his discovery of
the superiority of reason over force as the better way merit him the
honor of membership in the Nebraska Hall of Fame.
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